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

Dear EurSafe Members,

Once more I have the honour to present you with a new issue of EurSafe News. This is a special issue, though, as it is compiled at the occasion of the PhD defence of one of EurSafe News' editorial board members, Herwig Grimm. Please allow me to abuse this editorial to congratulate him. His defence brought me to realise that many of the people we see at our conferences are PhD students, which means that over the last decade many dissertations must have been completed by EurSafe members. Most of them did not get the amount of attention they deserved. And is it not in ethics, above all, that the broader picture (the thesis) is more important than the specific situation (the article)?
To me it seems that EurSafe News is the perfect medium to fill the gap between the *Is* and the *Ought*. And how better to start than to celebrate Herwig's defence by giving you all an insight in his thesis, and in the works of some of EurSafe's notable members that defended their PhDs over the last decade?

But, let's not stop here! If you have defended your PhD within the EurSafe era (or: if you have supervised such a PhD), send us a summary and we'll share your work with all our members. And if you're about to submit your thesis, be sure to send us a copy!

Next to the summaries we receive, the next issue of EurSafe News will include it's own thematic section. Herwig Grimm (Herwig.Grimm@elkb.de) invites you all to contribute to the theme "Between Kopenhagen and Bilbao: EurSafe members and projects on climate change and food security".

Best wishes to you all, Stef Aerts, *Chief-editor*

Thematic section

Pragmatism in Agricultural Ethics: Diagnosis or Cure?
Herwig Grimm, Institute TTN, Munich

Celebrating EurSafe PhDs

Practical ethical issues like “Is the farrowing crate morally justified?” challenge ethicists in at least three respects: First, such practical problems originate in a loss of orientation in action and are therefore normative in nature. Secondly, they are entangled with empirical facts in such a way that they cannot be solved without taking empirical knowledge into account. Thirdly, they are *real life problems*. Neither are they problems of philosophical speculation, nor are they used to demonstrate ethical methodology or theoretical shortcomings only. The main questions of my doctoral thesis were how to develop practical solutions for ethical problems like the farrowing crate and as to whether pragmatism can provide methodological support.

Pragmatism in Applied Ethics
An increasing number of ethicists find valuable alternatives to abstract and vague ethical theories in pragmatic approaches and refer to theories of Peirce, James or Dewey and the pragmatic tradition. Various reasons can be given for this revival. One among them is the promise to solve practical problems of the outlined nature, which is especially tempting for ethicists working in the field of practice-oriented ethics. It is claimed that pragmatism can circumvent deficiencies of abstract ethical theories, which Putnam pinpointed some years ago:

[…]; when a philosopher ›solves‹ an ethical problem for one, one feels as if one had asked for a subway token and been given a passenger ticket valid for the first interplanetary passenger-carrying spaceship instead. (Putnam 1992, 179)

To have a tool or method for solving ethical problems without losing sight of the concrete circumstances, could justly be called a *cure* for abstract and vague philosophical methodology in applied ethics. Consequently, more and more ethicists follow this line of thought and develop feasible tools, practice-oriented models or – and this is the focus of my thesis – pragmatic methods for solving problems in the field of applied ethics.

Theoretical and Practical Demands

Looking more closely at the field of applied ethics, we discover that the attempt to cure the illnesses of abstract ethical theory with a pragmatic remedy sometimes falls short in theoretical foundations and methodological reflection. In methodological terms, it does not seem at all clear what it means to be a pragmatist. Sometimes authors feel justified to call themselves “pragmatists” by only indicating that they are inspired by thoughts of American pragmatism (Fins/Bacchetta/Miller 2003). It is fair enough that critics point out that pragmatism should not serve as a methodological “anything goes”. One of them – being a pragmatist himself – sketches the problem briefly:

My hunch is that one of the best ways to get our colleagues in various fields of applied ethics to adopt more unpragmatic approaches to their work is to argue that they should consider becoming pragmatists. (Light 2002, 89)

The claim to work in a pragmatic manner does not free authors from methodological demands and philosophical constraints. If authors are guided by the idea to solve ethical problems at whatever methodological cost and fall short in developing theoretically sound positions, pragmatism is not a cure but a *diagnosis* of a freehand undertaking that erodes the scientific basis of moral philosophy (Tollefsen/Cherry 2003). In my thesis I argue that pragmatism has – within limits – sufficient theoretical resources to found a valid methodology for solving practical problems in applied ethics. However, to develop a solid pragmatic methodology is not as easy as it is often thought.

John Dewey’s Theory of Inquiry as a Model for Applied Ethics

The main part of my thesis deals with the transformation of John Dewey’s Pattern of Inquiry (Dewey 1938, 105-122), a description of the general structure of empirical science, into an ethical methodology. Similar to Peirce, Dewey considers the methodology of empirical sciences as the most promising approach and best model to guide the reconstruction in the humanities and moral philosophy (Dewey 1920, 172-186). It takes its starting point at the practical level of a problematic situation and describes five steps of effective problem solving:

i) Indeterminate Situation

ii) Institution of a Problem

iii) Determination of a Problem-Solution

iv) Reasoning

v) Testing the Hypothesis by Action

Dewey himself never translated these steps into ethics, nor did his followers. His approach is often stated and used in applied ethics without considering the methodological implications of his method (Pamental 2004; Moreno 2003 [1999]). This comes as a surprise since ethical problems obviously show different characteristics than empirical ones. In my analysis of Dewey I demonstrate the possibility to use *The Pattern of Inquiry* as a model in applied ethics, further, how it works on the farrowing crate and what methodological implications and limitations arise.

Pragmatic Methodology for Solving Problems in Agricultural Ethics

In the following I want to present some corner stones of this methodology and identify a few advantages and limits of philosophical pragmatism in applied ethics. Basically, the method directs the transformation of abstract ethical principles into practical contexts while taking the responsible actor's limitations into account. In my thesis the farrowing crate served as the study case. There the reader is supported by a number of images of various farrowing crates and alternative housing systems, calculations and tables as well as philosophical reflections that cannot be presented in a short article.

According to the outlined *Pattern of Inquiry* inquiry starts with the experience of a confusing or ambiguous situation. Doubt and perplexity serve as indicators that our dispositions to act (habits) do not sufficiently direct behaviour any longer. In terms of morals, the starting point of moral inquiry is *moral doubt*; a vague intuition that there is something morally wrong with a certain situation. Applied to the study case, the farrowing crate, a farmer asks as to whether the fixation of the mother sow is morally right e.g. triggered by internal or external criticism. The following steps of ethical reflection provide a structured approach to give guidance on answering such questions.

The second step deals with the formulation of the problem. In order to know what the problem is, you need to know how to “move from I (initial state) to G (goal state) by O (operators) but without violating C (constraints)” (Hayes 1981). Obviously, a problem is an intellectualization of a pre-reflexive indeterminate situation and is a result of the process of deliberate inquiry. To identify its dimensions in a morally relevant manner, the inquirer has to have a methodological perspective on the situation. Without going into depth this perspective can be justified by relating the moral intuitions with moral principles. In the case of the farrowing crate, the moral intuition that the sow is badly treated can be rationalized by relating the behavioral constraints that cause suffering with the moral principle to avoid suffering. Under this perspective, moral deficiencies of the initial state (suffering because of behavioral constraints) and a vague goal state (less behavioral constraints) can be formulated.

In the third step, *ends-in-view* are to be formulated, which serve as hypothetical solutions (goal states) of the problem and make the vague goal state concrete. They have to be developed in close connection with the problematic situation since the conditions of the situation frame and limit possible solutions. Such a hypothetical solution has to overcome the moral deficiencies of the initial state and integrate empirical constraints. Therefore, an end-in-view is a (hypothetical) realization of a moral principle in a certain situation. In the case of the farrowing crate one can imagine a pen without fixation or group housing (less behavioral constraints).

The fourth step deals with the bearings of a hypothetical solution. It has to be tested in thought whether it is morally and empirically reasonable. E.g. significantly more squashed piglets because of the sow’s unrestricted movement would be a perfect moral reason against the hypothetical solution. However, empirical data shows that there are alternatives that do not cause more dead piglets (of course, other studies indicate the opposite). Further, if the farmer cannot realize the alternative housing system because of reasons like major loss in income without compensation, the alternative might be better under ethical perspective, but unrealizable. In order to structure such reflections, Dewey’s concept named *Dramatic Rehearsal* is developed for applied ethics in great detail. Using

pragmatic criteria like “practicability”, “feasibility”, “scientific soundness” and “ethical soundness”, hypothetical solutions are narrowed down to *adequate solutions* for the specific situation that can be theoretically realized by an actor. In my thesis I argue for a scenario with less behavioral constraints that can be plausibly reached.

The last step, testing the hypothetical solution by action, can only be carried out by responsible actors. Following Dewey, the process of inquiry can be considered successfully finished only if the hypothetical solution proves to solve the problem in action without violating empirical or moral constraints. At this point it becomes clear how important it is to identify the disparate responsibilities of actors and ethicists in ethical inquiry. E.g. to solve the problem by action is the responsibility of the farmer. On the other hand, the ethicist’s role and responsibility in moral inquiry can be identified as e.g. taking the restrictions of farmers into account and integrating contextual and scientific knowledge.

Conclusion

The resulting pragmatic methodology shows that Dewey’s *Pattern of Inquiry* can (with adjustments) be successfully transferred to the field of ethics and applied to practical ethical problems. It focuses on the individual actor’s responsibility and helps to realize moral principles. However, it cannot justify moral principles themselves nor can it solve theoretical problems in moral philosophy. As a melioristic step-by-step approach it aims to improve the actual situations in light of moral principles and provide feasible solutions that responsible actors can in fact realize. In this view, pragmatism is not the universal remedy in ethics, but one helpful stepping stone to bring ethics into practice.

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Contact
Herwig Grimm, Institute TTN, Munich
Herwig.grimm@elkb.de

Trustworthiness as the key to problems of trust in food

Franck L.B. Meijboom, Ethics Institute, Utrecht

All over Europe trust in public and market institutions is in the spotlight (cf. FAO 2003; Poppe & Kjaernes 2003). Especially the introduction of technologies such as biotechnology has raised various questions of trust. This does not directly imply that we are confronted with a crisis of trust. The problem is that people have to rely on others, but often do not know whom to trust. I call this the 'problem of trust'.

The dominant (regulatory) approach to this problem aims at establishing trust by providing information on risks and increasing the predictability of the product. Despite the importance of both aspects, there are two problems. First, transparency and risk communication already presume some levels of trust. Only if one already considers the provider of information reliable, the information becomes

useful. Therefore, an overriding emphasis on risk communication only begs the question. Second and even more important, trust is fundamentally different from taking risks, even though they can be relevant in the same situation. Trust is not the outcome of an assessment of the risks and benefits of trusting in the light of the aims and goals one pursues. In contrast to someone who takes risks, a truster is not counting, but coping with complexity. He is not calculating risks, but dealing with the uncertainty he is faced with. Therefore, better risk assessment and more risk information do not necessarily lead to more trust.

In my thesis (Meijboom, 2008), I claim that the 'problem of trust' have to be addressed as a question of trustworthiness. For this claim there are conceptual and moral reasons. On the one hand, it has a conceptual background. An individual cannot decide to trust. One may want to trust, but one cannot trust at will. On the other hand, the autonomy of the individual provides a strong moral reason for this shift. A lack of or hesitance to trust should be acknowledged as a legitimate point of view, rather than as a failure only. This does not imply that the truster cannot be wrong, but shows that the burden of the proof also lies at the level of trustworthiness. Even though a trusting relationship is by definition asymmetric and includes differences in knowledge and power, the truster should be treated as a person who is capable of autonomous agency. Consequently, the main question is not how the individual can be changed so that he will trust, but what conditions the trustee has to fulfill in order to be worthy of trust. I have defined three conditions for trustworthiness.

First, trustworthiness should be more than predictability. Trust is a way of dealing with the uncertainty that comes with the freedom of agency, rather than with uncertainty as such. If a trustee would invariably act according to a predictable pattern determined by his nature or its organisational structure, it would be like relying on a machine. Machines perform, they do not deliberate; machines are programmed, not motivated. Consequently, they can be reliable, but not trustworthy. Therefore, to be trustworthy, the trusted agent should not merely act in a predictable way, but should be motivated to respond to what is entrusted. To be trustworthy means that one is not just predictable, but is worthy of trust even though he has

the power to do otherwise. Consequently, the problem of trust cannot merely be reduced to a lack of predictability or a need for structures on which a truster can anticipate.

Second, trustworthiness should start from the duty to show due respect for the truster as a person who is capable of autonomous agency. Despite the vulnerable status of the truster, trustworthiness is predicated on recognition of the truster as a moral agent and as a moral equal. In general, it implies that a truster ought not to be considered just as a vulnerable person, but that he should be treated as person who has the capacity to choose his own goals and values. This respect results in some clear constraints on what counts as trustworthy behaviour. If trust were about dealing with uncertainty as such, then power, coercion, or controlling behaviour would be relevant methods, which would help to establish trust. However, if we take freedom, agency and a participant attitude as constitutive for trust, these options are incompatible.

Finally, trustworthiness requires the ability to cope with the problem of conflicting moral expectations that results from the respect of the truster as a moral agent and a moral equal. This requires a balance between accommodation and integrity. If one starts out from respect for the truster, her views have to be taken seriously even if they are in conflict with those of the trustee. This requires accommodation, which implies that the trustee should be open to the other's moral view, should be prepared to change his view and should be willing to actively search for new ways to deal with the conflict. To deal with such a conflict making compromises is often inevitable. The trustworthiness of an agent who makes compromises in every situation can be questioned. Compromises easily get a character of arbitrariness if the truster does not have legitimate reasons for the decision whether or not to act according to the expectation of the truster. Moreover, on an institutional level, it is sometimes unclear to whose view one should accommodate given the many trusters and many expectations. Nonetheless, I claim that is possible to remain trustworthy and make the compromises that are sometimes necessary from the perspective of accommodation.

Having integrity is essential with respect to this. Integrity does not just complicate the demand of accommodation. It can provide reflected constraints on the demand of accommodation. Integrity understood as a sincere commitment of the trustee with 'those projects and principles which are constitutive of one's core identity' or with the tasks and aims that are constitutive for an institution, lead to constraints on the demand of accommodation that are not arbitrary. They are not beyond debate, but they are reflected and the trustee can give legitimate reasons for the decision whether or not to act in the expected way. Consequently, not everyone will trust this agent, but the agent is trustworthy despite of the confrontation with the moral conflict.

These conditions for trustworthiness do not solve all problems of trust. In practice, it even can be frustrating to lose trust although one has legitimate reasons not to act in the expected way. Despite this frustration, this is better than trying to look for ways to get people to trust an agent although this agent is not trustworthy, either because he is not competent or not adequately motivated. If one is trusted, but not trustworthy, the problem of trust will return in the end. Trying to be trustworthy in the above-mentioned way help a truster to assess who is worthy of trust, which is a necessary condition to build and maintain trust.

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Contact
Franck L.B. Meijboom
Ethics Institute, Utrecht University
f.l.b.meijboom@uu.nl

The expression of emotions and learning in cattle

Kristin Hagen, Europäische Akademie zur Erforschung von Folgen wissenschaftlich-technischer Entwicklungen, Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler

Social structure is an important aspect of the biology and psychology of cattle. Social structure can be seen at the level of an entire herd, but also in terms of relations between individuals. One aim of my study was to shed some light on how cattle may experience the identity of familiar herd members. The starting point for this was to investigate their ability for individual recognition. We tested the ability of six young South Devon cattle to discriminate between socially familiar conspecifics in a Y-maze discrimination experiment. The Y-maze was built from electric fencing (with no electricity on; the animals were used to active electric fencing though). The discriminative stimuli were herd members tethered in the Y-maze side arms (stimulus heifers; all heifers in the study were halter-trained and used to being tethered, behaving calmly in this situation). Approach to one of the stimulus heifers was rewarded with food. Approach to the other was unrewarded. Their positions were randomly swapped. Each of the six experimental heifers was subjected to two pairs of stimulus heifers; three were subjected to Pair A first, three to Pair B. All subjects reached the learning criterion (19 out of 20 consecutive correct choices to the rewarded stimulus heifer's position in the Y-maze) with Pair A of stimulus heifers. With the Pair B, learning was slower and only three of the subjects reached criterion. All heifers that reached criterion chose correctly in at least five additional trials designed to control for cues emanating from the experimenter's behaviour or from the food reward. We conclude that cattle can discriminate between individual familiar conspecifics, that they can learn discrimination tasks quickly, and that speed of learning and level of correct response can be influenced by the identity of the stimulus individuals. We also explored the experimental heifers' behaviour during the learning process. As part of the experimental protocol, the heifers stood in a start area overlooking the two Y-maze arms for about one minute before they were allowed to enter a maze arm. Their behaviour during this time period was studied on the basis of video records. Behaviours indicative of agitation were observed more often in the second task than in the first and also increased with time during learning tasks ($P<0.05$), but were not related to whether a heifer made a correct choice. Head orientation predicted the correct direction when this was subsequently chosen ($P<0.05$).

Therefore, in a second experiment, the emotional reactions of heifers during acquisition of an operant task were studied. During situations when animals learn something, they may experience both positive and negative emotions. It has been suggested that during instrumental learning, animals are likely to react emotionally to the reinforcer. After initially describing general expressions of emotions during a learning process, I aimed at designing an experimental approach that might shed light on whether cattle react emotionally to the very process of learning, to their own achievements, and thus in a sense to their own agency. We devised a yoked control experiment involving the acquisition of an operant task. We aimed to identify the emotional reactions of young cattle to their own learning and to separate these from reactions to a food reward. Twelve Holstein–Friesian heifers aged 7–12 months were divided into two groups. Heifers in the experimental group were conditioned over a 14-day period to press a panel while alone in a start area visually isolated from the rest of the herd. Pressing the panel made a gate open, which allowed them to exit the start area and gave access to a race, at the end of which the heifers received a food reward. For heifers in the control group, the gate opened after a delay equal to their matched partner's latency to open it, i.e. contingent on their matched partner's, not on their own behaviour. To allow for observation of the heifers' movements during locomotion after the gate had opened, there was a 15 m distance in the form of a race from the gate to the food trough. The heart rate of the heifers, and their behaviour when moving along the race towards the food reward were measured. When experimental heifers made clear improvements in learning, they were more likely than on other occasions to have higher heart rates just before the gate opened, and tended to move more vigorously along the race in comparison with their controls. This experiment found some, albeit inconclusive, indication that cattle may react emotionally to their own learning improvement. Another experiment was designed to follow up the second with a different operant (putting the nose into a box) and an additional discrimination task (light vs. dark box), using a new set of six pairs of heifers. In this herd, all heifers showed high levels of excitement during movement throughout, and effects of learning on this behaviour were not found. The heifers' heart rates were not clearly related to the learning processes. The discrimination task was not learned very well.

A herd of young cattle was observed so as to determine the individuals' positions during voluntary herd movements. Some individuals showed consistent absolute (i.e. order in the herd) or relative (i.e. behind / in front of which herd member) positions with regard to such movements. There appeared to be patterns of individuals' relative positions that were not predicted by their absolute positions. The reason for this is probably that there are a number of motivational factors potentially underlying the order in which the individuals in a herd move, and the motivations may well differ from individual to individual. Whereas some of the animals in a herd might be motivated to get from where they are to where they are going, others might just go along because it is in their nature to follow, rather than stay behind. In this situation, given the dyadic social relationships within a herd, it could be asked whether there might be a motivation, not just to stay with the group as a whole, but also to stay with certain group members, and to avoid others.

It is nowadays uncommon to keep cattle in close contact with the urban population. However, the parks in the city centre of Cambridge, UK, have for a long time been common land,. Commoners (residents of Cambridge) have the right to let their livestock (cattle and horses) graze on the commons, following certain rules related to age (not normally animals under 18 months of age), sex (females and castrates only), pregnancy (no animals within one month of parturition), seasons (1st of April to end of November), and a restriction on numbers. During the grazing season, the Pindar, who is employed by the City Council for this purpose, looks after the animals. Initial informal observations of the cattle on the commons had given the impression that the cattle had an unusually short avoidance distance with unfamiliar humans, often ignoring completely humans passing within a few metres distance. This might be a result of a process of habituation, and of learning the predictability of people moving across the commons. Another initial observation was that the cattle seemed to move with very little dispersion of the herd. This could be a response to the almost constant presence of humans and dogs, who may remain a threatening stimulus. The purpose of the present study was to explore development of the relationship between people, dogs and cattle during the initial time on the commons, when any habituation and learning processes would be likely to

be occurring. Two herds of yearling cattle were observed for six weeks from their first arrival. The cattle changed their behaviour over this time, their habituation to the unusually public environment being most rapid during the first week. There were differences in the results between the two herds, consistent with the differences in the local environments: on Midsummer Common, where there were essentially no retreat possibilities for the cattle, the investigative behaviour as well as the distances to cyclists and pedestrians decreased. The dispersion of the herd increased compared with the very first response of staying all together, but the herd did stay closer together than elsewhere. On Sheep's Green, where the cattle could retreat to the quieter south part of the common, dispersion increased markedly with habituating, along with grazing and walking, and people were not observed to pass closer to the cattle as time on the common progressed.

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Contact
Kristin Hagen,
Europäische Akademie zur Erforschung von Folgen wissenschaftlich-technischer Entwicklungen,
Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler, Germany,
kristin.hagen@ea-aw.de

Motivation in laying hens: Studies of perching and dustbathing behaviour

Anna Olsson, Institute for Molecular and Cell Biology (IBMC), Porto

The growing resistance against keeping laying hens in cages has lead to changes in legislation and development of alternative housing systems. The ambition has been to develop systems that permit the hens to perform important behaviours, such as perching, nesting and dustbathing. But if the new housing systems are to be the intended improvement, it is important to understand how motivation for the actual behaviour is regulated. The behaviour of other individuals is a major factor influencing motivation in social animals such as chickens. Social effects may be particularly relevant in modified cages where resources such as nests and dustbaths are limited and can only be used by one hen at a time. If a behaviour is socially

facilitated, that is if seeing another hen performing the behaviour increases motivation, resource limitations may be a problem. The aim of this PhD project was to learn more about hens' motivation to perch and to study how social factors affect dustbathing motivation.

Article I (Olsson & Keeling Applied Animal Behaviour Science 68:243-256; 2000) describes a study of how hens in a small group use perches as well as their behaviour when the perches were unavailable. When having access to perches, all hens used these for resting at night, always perching on the top perch and closely together. When the perches were unavailable, the hens showed unrest, walked more and spent less time sitting.

Article II (Olsson & Keeling Animal Welfare, 11:11-19; 2002) describes a study measuring the hens' motivation to perch through an operant technique, using a so-called push-door. The door is placed between the hen and a resource of interest, and by manipulating the resistance needed to open the door, it is possible to measure motivation to access the resource. In the first experiment, the hens were given access to a perch on the other side of the door. Their behaviour in this situation was compared to a control without a perch. In the second experiment, the effect of the presence of another hen was measured. The same set-up was used, but the resources were either a perch with another hen perching or the same perch with another hen on the floor. In the first experiment, the hens opened heavier doors to access the perch than in the control situation, showing that they were motivated to access the perch to rest at night. In the second experiment, only half of the hens opened the door and there was no difference between treatments. Taken together, the two studies described in Articles I and II show that hens are motivated to perch at night.

Article III (Olsson, Keeling & Duncan Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 76:53-64; 2002) describes two experiments studying the social effects on dustbathing motivation. The test hens could first observe a stimulus consisting either in dustbathing hens, hens on litter but not dustbathing or litter only and were thereafter given access to dustbathing material. Behaviour during stimulus exposure as well as during litter access was studied. Stimulus hen behaviour did not affect subsequent

dustbathing behaviour in the test hens, suggesting that social facilitation is of limited importance for dustbathing motivation.

Article IV (Olsson et al Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 79:285-297; 2002) deals with vacuum dustbathing. A vacuum activity is one where a behaviour is performed without the relevant substrate – in the case of vacuum dustbathing the hens go through the movements of dustbathing but without litter. Vacuum dustbathing has previously been shown to be common in modified cages, despite a dustbath with litter being present in such cages. The aim with the three experiments in Article IV was to further investigate the background of such vacuum dustbathing. Before the start of the experiment, the hens were kept without litter up to 10 weeks in order for vacuum dustbathing to develop. In the first experiment, the hens were placed in a situation where they could either dustbathe in litter, vacuum dustbathe or where dustbathing was completely prevented. Subsequently they were given access to litter, and their behaviour was studied during both parts of the test. The possibility to perform vacuum dustbathing during the first part of the test did not affect subsequent dustbathing behaviour in litter, suggesting that for these hens, performing vacuum dustbathing did not reduce dustbathing motivation. In the second experiment, hens without access to litter could observe a stimulus consisting either in dustbathing hens on litter, hens on litter but not dustbathing or hens without litter and not dustbathing. Vacuum dustbathing was not affected by the observed stimulus, suggesting that there is no effect of social facilitation. In the third experiment, the hens which had been kept without litter were given access to litter in a different place than that where they used to vacuum dustbathe. Although most hens dustbathed in litter the first day they had access, some hens continued to vacuum dustbathe for several days despite litter being available. This suggests that habit or previous experience affects whether hens vacuum dustbathe.

Taken together, the studies of perching show that hens reared with access to perches are motivated to use these for their night rest. The dustbathing study show that social facilitation is of limited importance for dustbathing motivation. Vacuum dustbathing does not reduce motivation to dustbathe in litter and can also not be

explained by social facilitation or competition for limited space in the dustbath. Nevertheless, vacuum dustbathing is frequent in modified cages with a dustbath. A possible explanation is once vacuum dustbathing has developed in hens reared without litter, they may continue to perform this behaviour also when given access to litter.

Revisiting 2001 in 2010 – a short reflection

It is an honour and a pleasure to take up this invitation to present my PhD thesis in the EurSafe newsletter. Strictly speaking, my EurSafe activity doesn't overlap with my PhD: I only learnt about the society later the same year when I realized that understanding ethics was crucial for my postdoctoral work on laboratory animal behaviour and welfare. On the other hand, the subject of my thesis clearly falls within the scope of EurSafe. My own motivation to pursue that particular PhD topic was the same that drives my research today: an interest in the topic and the methodology combined with the desire to work with something of relevance for society. My PhD coincided with what I think was the peak of interest in operant techniques – "making animals vote with their feet" – in applied ethology and animal welfare research. A colleague of my supervisor kindly brought one push-door over from Scotland, and we got three more built through a combined effort of the experimental farm handyman and the local television repair shop – definitely an exciting and sometimes frustrating part of the project. Also the dustbathing studies involved a fair amount of construction work. A good thing of constructing test equipment for hens is that they're not very inclined towards destroying materials (as opposed to pigs and mice, my other two species of choice), but the fact that they can fly presents a different set of challenges, and escaping hens were part of most experiments, in one way or the other. There are clear advantages with ethics as area of academic research! One final reflection I can't resist adding is the bewildered look of the director of my present institute when I (in the typical manner of a recent PhD graduate, happily unaware of that the rest of the world may have a completely different understanding of the central terms of one's work) answered his question about the topic of my thesis: "But do you really think productivity is affected by how motivated the hens are?"

Contact
Anna Olsson, Institute for Molecular and Cell Biology - IBMC, Porto, Portugal, olsson@ibmc.up.pt sddfs

A Deliberative Ethical Matrix Method – Justification of Moral Advice on Genetic Engineering in Food Production

Ellen-Marie Forsberg, Arbeidsforskningsinstituttet / Work Research Institute, Oslo

Background for the work

The existence of a plethora of ethical committees, performing various kinds of ethical evaluations and giving advice on ethical issues, has become an ever more present feature of modern Western societies. These committees have different functions, for instance handling internal conflicts or dilemmas in organisations, applying and enforcing ethical codes or guidelines (e.g. medical research ethics committees) or advising different authorities on sensitive issues that evoke public concerns (e.g. genetic engineering of food, stemcell research, etc.). Often they are asked to give advice when there is moral conflict between affected parties or between moral principles. The committees typically consist of experts, such as engineers, doctors, scientists, or other professional groups that are relevant to the particular tasks. Professional ethicists (usually philosophers or theologians) may be included and in some countries one also attaches importance to the inclusion of lay people. However, there is usually little connection between concrete, practical assessment of ethical issues on the one hand, and academic ethics and ethical theory on the other. Admittedly, reference is often made to the main approaches in ethics, such as utilitarianism or Kantianism, but it is often hard to see how these references relate to the final judgements. This project is part of a general project of constructing closer ties between practical ethical work and practical (and theoretical) philosophy. In the case of public scrutiny and academic quality control, ethical committees should be expected to be able to provide an account of what makes their advice 'better', that is, more justified, than just any advice. This dissertation is a contribution to this aspiration. It deals specifically with the method called 'the ethical matrix', but many of the discussions apply to several other methods (also called 'ethical tools') as well. The importance of the issue of quality control of ethical advice runs parallel with the general developments in metaethics where there is much activity and progress in the discussions of moral justification.

Giving ethical advice on biotechnology issues

The field of biotechnology includes many different kinds of technologies. One may separate between medical biotechnology applied to human beings and biotechnology

applied to plants, animals and micro-organisms. One might also distinguish between biotechnology in a broad sense (including selective breeding, etc.) and gene technology. The main focus in this dissertation is with plant biotechnology, in particular genetic engineering.

Technology ethics in general deals both with the acceptability of technologies as such and with how technologies are to be applied. Technological innovation is developing increasingly rapidly. People today have options that were unimaginable only decades ago. This gives us choice today where there earlier was only circumstance, and it makes us responsible where we earlier were vulnerable. This is one reason why ethical concerns are becoming more expressed. There is now public pressure for public and private decision makers to take more ethical responsibility. This is a responsibility that includes both safety for humans and the environment, consideration of future generations, societal justice and respect for inherent properties of human and non-human nature.

There is such a turning towards ethics in all areas of public life, reflected in policy on many levels, from ethics committees to including ethics in legislation. Not least because of the public opposition to genetically modified food (cf. the Eurobarometer on attitudes towards biotechnology among Europeans, Gaskell et al. 2003), ethics in the biotechnology area in Europe received an official mandate with the new directive 2001/18/EC (regarding deliberate release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into the environment), taking effect from October 2002. Here, requirements related to threats to human health and the environment, taking the precautionary principle into account, were strengthened. The new directive mentions the importance of taking ethical considerations into account, but does not prescribe mandatory assessments of ethics or sustainability. What remains crucial is therefore the risk assessment related to human health, the environment and feed safety. In Norway, however, the purpose of the Gene Technology Act has a wider scope:

§ 1 Purpose of the Act

The purpose of this Act is to ensure that the production and use of genetically modified organisms and the production of

cloned animals take place in an ethically justifiable and socially acceptable manner, in accordance with the principle of sustainable development and without adverse effects on health and the environment.

With these kinds of public expectations and new legislation, decision making becomes increasingly difficult. This dissertation is a contribution to the possibility of quality control of ethical assessments. In particular, it deals with the use of principle-based methods for performing ethical evaluations of biotechnology. Ethical assessment of notifications of production or marketing of GMOs is a central issue. Although I argue that the method I investigate is particularly suited to the biotechnology context, it can be used to assess a wide variety of issues in other sectors as well; such as other types of technology and strategy choices with societal implications. However, the main intention of the project was to contribute to raising the quality of ethical advice on biotechnology issues. The given decision making context must be clear for the discussion to be relevant, and is thus limited to that of Norway and of the EU.

The structure of the dissertation

The thesis has the following structure. This first chapter provides an introduction to the overarching issue of the project: justification of advice on ethical issues related to biotechnology in food production. The second chapter describes the moral concerns that ethical assessments of GMOs must be able to deal with. It identifies these concerns from two sources: a scrutiny of the debate about Roundup Ready GM rapeseed (GT73), and the project GM Nation? The Public Debate. The diversity of concerns identified indicates that any tool that is used to assess these kinds of issues must be versatile and wide in scope. This width of concerns found in the debates amounts to evidential support for the claim that there are indeed a plurality of principles and value priorities surrounding the issue of genetic modification. This justifies the use of intuitionist tools like the ethical matrix and it supports the focus on a radical pluralism defended in chapter 4. Another function of the example is to shed light on decision procedures in the EU. The second chapter also briefly describes committees that give ethical advice related to GMOs, what expectations they meet and how ‘ethical tools’ may help them meet these expectations.

The third chapter introduces principle-based ethics and the version of principle-based ethics that is the focus in the thesis: the ethical matrix method. It is shown that the ethical matrix is a 'tool' in a larger 'toolkit' for addressing ethical issues in gene technology ethics. The ethical matrix is a development of a tool central to biomedical ethics, Beauchamp and Childress' principlism, which is briefly presented prior to the introduction of the ethical matrix. First, the original version of the ethical matrix method, developed by Ben Mepham and his colleagues at the University of Nottingham, is presented and preliminarily discussed. Then Kaiser and Forsberg's version of the matrix method is presented, and similarities and differences between the two versions are addressed. Issues related to Kaiser and Forsberg's use will be central in the following discussion, in particular with regard to how to conceptualise the ethical matrix method as a comprehensive judgement aid. Giving such an account of how to conclude from the material provided through the different steps in the matrix process has been an important theoretical lacuna of the method. A number of alternative accounts are suggested in chapter 3 and these are in chapter 4 assessed according to whether they indeed can account for how to draw conclusions, as well as whether they are compatible with two criteria for judgement making that are seen as important in this decision making context. These two criteria, briefly presented in chapter 2 and more thoroughly discussed in chapter 4, are pluralism and the need for public justification. Two forms of pluralism are discussed as particularly relevant: principled pluralism and value pluralism. Principled pluralism refers to the intuitionist background of the ethical matrix method. Value pluralism refers to the public and political context in which ethical advice is given. In the discussion of Ross, the intuitionist character of the ethical matrix also becomes clearer. In an intuitionist context the problem of drawing conclusions on cases is called the problem of balancing. So the discussion of intuitionist pluralism enables giving a more specific definition of the problem to be discussed in the following chapters: how to justify balancing decisions in the matrix method. The second criterion, the need for public justification, is also explained in more detail. It includes two slightly different aspects: a) the advice must be made in a way that can be theoretically accounted for by reference to a theory of justification, and b) the advice must have a transparency and accessibility that allows the public to

scrutinise it. The criteria of value pluralism and public justification are not argued for normatively; it is argued descriptively that these are contextual assumptions that a practical decision making method must conform to. However, a stance on the appropriate radicality of value pluralism is taken based on the discussions. With the two criteria of pluralism and public justification in place it is at the end of chapter 4 possible to revisit the list of alternatives from chapter 3. It turns out that only two alternatives for accounting for the concluding step can be defended when 'screened' on these two criteria: the method of reflective equilibrium and communicative deliberation. These two accounts are critically assessed in chapters 5 and 6.

Chapter 5 discusses coherentism in the form of reflective equilibrium. Coherentism is the solution chosen by Beauchamp and Childress, and since their method is basically the pattern for the matrix method one might reasonably expect that their solution should also work here (as indeed Mepham suggests). However, when the relation between Beauchamp and Childress' justificatory account and their method is studied in more detail, it turns out that there are some significant problems. I argue that Beauchamp and Childress do not provide a convincing account of how the method of reflective equilibrium can be applied to an approach with prima facie principles and no strict moral theory. The conclusion is thus that one cannot both be an intuitionist and claim that balancing solutions are justified in reflective equilibrium. Coherentism is therefore rejected as an adequate justificatory model for balancing decisions in the ethical matrix method.

Chapter 6 addresses the last possibility on the list from chapter 3: deliberative group judgement or communicative deliberation. This possibility coincides with the way the matrix method has been used by Kaiser and Forsberg, but the justification for this practice has never been spelled out. First, Habermas' discourse ethics is considered as a deliberative, justificatory account, but it is found that his model is too limited. Habermas' discourse ethics only provides justification for prima facie principles and not for the balancing conclusions. For this, Habermas refers to coherentism, and the problems from chapter 5 would reappear. Another Peircean approach, Cheryl Misak's approach to moral justification, is then considered. It turns

out that this approach can also account for how balancing decisions can be both justified and true (in a pragmatist sense). I argue that we in this theory have found an approach that satisfies both criteria from chapter 4 and that is not inconsistent with the elements of the matrix method. I do not try to argue that Misak's approach is the only possible framework for the ethical matrix. I only try to argue that this is one approach that indeed seems to work. It seems therefore that we are able to provide a complete account of how the matrix method in an appropriate setting can yield justified conclusions on ethical issues. Chapter 7 shows in more detail how the pragmatist deliberative account can support conclusions from the matrix method and, moreover, how the matrix method can make the deliberative process an explicit ethical tool. This chapter also summarises the lessons learnt from the discussions of the earlier chapters with regard to how the ethical matrix method should be formulated. With this complete account we are now able to pick up the loose ends from chapter 3, e.g. how to conceptualise the content of the value matrix and the status of the affected parties and the principles. Finally, some overall reflections on a deliberative matrix method are presented. Chapter 8 summarises the finding of the thesis and reflects on certain methodological choices.

Upon completion of my doctoral degree I tested some of the hypotheses from the thesis in a practical workshop. This workshop revealed further complexities than I discussed in the thesis. The results from this workshop can be found in the preprints for the EurSafe conference in Vienna: Forsberg, E-M. 2007. 'Report from a Value Workshop on GM Rapeseed'.In Zollitsch, W., Winkler, C., Waiblinger, S. and Haslberger, A. (eds.) Sustainable food production and ethics. Wageningen Academic Publishers, pp. 442-49

Contact
Ellen-Marie Forsberg, Arbeidsforskningsinstitutte t / Work Research Institute, Oslo, Norway, Ellen.Marie.Forsberg@afi-wri.no

Practice-oriented ethical models to bridge animal production, ethics and society

Stef Aerts, Katholieke Universiteit Sint-Niklaas, Leuven

If one agrees that ethical behaviour is essential in a civilised society, ethics can never be an "option", some sort of sauce served with the main dish, according to the cook's or eater's preference. If ethical behaviour is important, than it is – or at least, it should be – an integral part of any act or decision. In that case, ethics cannot be a theoretical set of principles without a connection to day-to-day life, although – unfortunately – it is often perceived that way.

Practice-oriented ethics

This may well be a consequence of the failure to recognise the different levels of ethical theories. Often reference is only made to general or metaethical theories, which may indeed seem insufficient or even unfit to resolve issues in daily life. This ignores the existence of applied ethical theories that do focus on the ethical issues surrounding specific parts of human life (such as medicine, science, business and also animal production). Applied ethics seeks to structure these ethical issues using a metaethical framework and tries to develop guidelines (not only in the form of “deontological codes”) for ethical behaviour, i.e. applied ethics theorises about practical issues.

Even these applied ethical theories will not always suffice. When more than one of these applied theories comes into play, for example when environmental, animal welfare and health issues are at stake or because not all parties involved adhere to the same theories, decision-making will be difficult due to conflicting claims and values. A third level of ethical deliberation will be necessary in such cases, the often-ignored but important level introduced in chapter one; a level specifically dealing with how to take decisions in daily life, i.e. practice-oriented ethics.

Thus, it is maybe better not to talk about practice-oriented ethical theories, but about (practice-oriented) ethical tools (decision, assessment or evaluation tools). Such tools should help to identify the ethically best option in a specific situation, considering all ethically relevant claims. This means that a problem cannot be treated as an isolated issue; if different issues arise they should all be treated at the same time, which will almost inevitably result in some sort of trade-off. Furthermore, such tools should be relevant in a pluralist society where different (meta)ethical traditions (such as utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics) and various ethical positions (anthropocentric, zoocentric, ecocentric, etc.) are present. Looking for "the most important value" in such a society often results in discussions if people believe different values are conflicting. Most people are not trained in matters of ethics, so these traditions and positions may be present subconsciously and not be readily recognised as such. In those cases, the path towards a decision is almost as important as the decision itself, something which has to be taken into account while developing ethical tools.

New tools

Animal welfare is one of the most important ethical issues in contemporary animal production. Many factors have contributed to a changing production environment in which the animal itself is no more than one input factor. Especially intensive farming systems operate on a tight equilibrium of production circumstances, which means there is an increased risk of welfare problems. Animal production in general is currently under much closer social and ethical scrutiny than it has ever been. Three practice-oriented ethical tools have been developed to assist in on-farm welfare assessment, in communication about animal welfare and in the control of animal diseases.

On-farm welfare assessment

If all attempts to approach animal welfare directly are futile, an indirect route seems more promising. It is possible to apply the general layered model to the problem of animal welfare assessment (see chapter 3). The goal (animal welfare) is then segmented in three objectives or “components” (housing, management, animal) contributing to the final welfare state of the animal.

Communication about animal welfare

Because animal welfare is such a difficult topic to capture and because the distance between animal production and most of the consumers has grown considerably during the previous decades, communication about animal welfare has become increasingly difficult. Not only communication between the production sector and the public (consumers/citizens) is difficult, but even communication between “professionally involved” stakeholders is often defective.

Within the concept of the layered model (goal – objective – indicator), it is possible to create a communication instrument. The first step is to identify common general concepts attached to animal welfare (the “objectives” in the model). These concepts should appeal to all stakeholders involved in animal production, i.e. producers and consumers as well as all others (economic actors, pressure groups, media, policy makers, scientists, etc.). Four values have been identified that are suitable for this role: (1) economic welfare as a cornerstone for a good living quality, (2) respect, (3) care, and (4) taking responsibility.

In order to facilitate the use of the indicator set, a spider diagram has been developed. In such a diagram, the indicators are represented by intersecting axes and annual indicator values are plotted on the axes. This gives a rapid overview of the state and evolution of individual indicators as well as the general welfare situation. The diagram is a useful communication vehicle and together with all the information in the model, it is a useful basis for further dialogue on social animal welfare concerns.

Animal disease control

Animal disease control is another facet of animal production that has been under considerable social pressure. Due to changes in the production context the number of animal disease outbreaks has increased dramatically during the last two decades. Different intervention scenarios are possible during such an outbreak, but choosing between them is difficult. There are many different expectations among the different stakeholders in the debate, making it impossible to easily identify a “good” intervention scenario. Additionally, the people responsible for disease control, are often trained in technical matters, resulting in no small unease when facing some of these “subjective” expectations.

Again, a solution to this problem has been found within the concept of the layered model (see chapter 5). In the Animal Disease Intervention Matrix (ADIM) a list of 15 objectives of animal disease control have been made explicit, corresponding with the stakeholders’ expectations. Each of these has been provided with a set of (three to nine) indicators. Together with the Disease Information Chart (DIC), this enables a transparent and structured evaluation and comparison of different disease intervention scenarios.

With the ADIM comes an implicit invitation for cooperation between the different stakeholder groups. Many of the issues targeted in the ADIM are not purely technical, and they draw information from many different fields of expertise. Ideally, it should therefore be used (or at least supervised) by a working group in which different stakeholder groups are represented.

Cooperation

Cooperation and multistakeholder dialogue are two important concepts within this work. Not only have their

theoretical contributions been acknowledged, but they have been put into practice in two very concrete situations. The development of the ADIM as well as its first simulation has been performed with the cooperation of a diverse group of stakeholder representatives and a similar process has led to the construction of a communication instrument about animal welfare, the spider diagram.

Dialogue and cooperation are important keys to progress in the difficult field of (farm) animal welfare. Dialogue is not to be confused with discussion, which is a plain exchange of arguments with the intent to change the others believes; it is the exchange of ideas and views with the intent to achieve a deeper understanding of each others views. While discussions tend to emphasise differences, dialogue processes are more about looking for similarities and they can – in the longer term – help to create some form of mutual understanding between stakeholders that are typically on different sides of welfare disputes. Although this understanding may not (and need not) be all-embracing, it is a necessary step towards cooperation (even if only in a small number of domains).

Conclusion

The strive for more farm animal welfare will not be an unidirectional movement. Although the general direction and some landmarks may be clear, there are too many factors influencing the final route towards a win-win situation for all stakeholders. Most notably, there are very few certainties in animal welfare issues. This will inevitably slow progress, but it should not be allowed to stop it. Demanding a high level of precision leaves us with empty hands if getting a precise and reliable assessment is difficult. All in all, always insisting on high-level precision clutters the discussion at best, if it does not ruin it. Emphasising (scientific) certainty as a prerequisite for change is a sophism, as there is no such thing.

In certain cases, stepping back from certainty is taking a step forward. Using objective-indicator systems such as those in this work will be an important part of this strategy, as they may be an important bridge between scientific, ethical and social concerns. Nevertheless, allowing dialogue and looking for cooperation will be the most important step. Aristotle (350BC) already knew “the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate

Contact
Stef Aerts,
Katholieke Hogeschool Sint-Niklaas, Leuven, Belgium
stef.aerts@kahosl.be,

to the occasion", and with some vision even small steps of these agents will make large differences. The words of Sidgwick (1898) are very appropriate in the day-to-day decision-making of practice-oriented ethics:

"I think we should give up altogether the idea of getting to the bottom of things, arriving at agreement on the first principles of duty or the Summum Bonum."

EurSafe Executive Committee Update

Welcome to the Spring 2010 issue of the EurSafe newsletter.

The EurSafe Board is delighted to report that the preparations for the 9th EurSafe Congress are proceeding well.

EurSafe 2010 focuses on the very topical theme Global Food Security: Ethical and Legal Challenges and will take place in Bilbao, Spain on 16-18 September 2010. The event is organised by the University of Deusto, University of the Basque Country, Bilbao, Spain. Over submitted 80 abstracts have been accepted for the Congress.

A stimulating array of keynote presentations and sessions are planned by the organisers and updates on the programme are available on the Congress website http://www.eursafe2010.es/.
Registration is now open and we would encourage all of our members to circulate the Congress Announcements far and wide.

We are delighted to confirm that the Congress proceedings are published by Wageningen Academic Publishers (WAP) and will be available at the Congress. May we take this opportunity to remind authors that their extended abstracts are due on 26 March 2010. We are looking forward to another exciting event, at the 9th EurSafe Congress (16-18 September 2010).

On a final note, the Board will be holding a Board Meeting in May 2010 in The Netherlands, therefore if any Members wish to raise an issue or propose new activities, etc, please

do not hesitate to contact the Board via our Secretary, Franck Meijboom.

We wish you all a happy and flourishing Spring!

Kate Millar on behalf of the Executive Board

Conferences & Symposia 2010

March 25	**Adaptation to Climate Change Impacts on Biodiversity** Helmholtzzentrum für Umweltforschung - UFZ Leipziger KUBUS, Permoserstraße 15, 04317 Leipzig http://www.ufz.de/index.php?de=19018
March 28-31	**Global Conference on Agricultural Research for Development (GCARD)** Enhancing Development Impact from Research: Building on Demand, Montpellier, France http://www.egfar.org/egfar/website/gcard
April 13	**Workshop on Scientific Philosophy: Past and Future** Tilburg University Centre http://www.uvt.nl/tilps/sppf2010/
April 14-16	**Future of Philosophy of Science** Sydney-Tilburg Conference, Tilburg Center of Logic and Philosophy of Science, http://www.uvt.nl/tilps/FPS2010
April 14-16	**Plant Research in the Light of Climate Change - The benefits of environmental simulation** Helmholtz-Zentrum München http://www.helmholtz-muenchen.de/veranstaltungen/kongresse/kongresse-vorschau/index.html
April 15	**Governing Nanobiotechnology: Reinventing Oversight in the 21st Century** Hubert H. Humphrey Center, University of Minnesota http://www.lifesci.consortium.umn.edu
April 22-23	**13th EBSA Conference 2010** Ljubljana, Slovenia http://www.isbr.info/?q=node/139

April 25	**Lecture "Die Zukunft des Menschen: Wasser und Ernährung im Klimawandel"** Helmholtz-Geschäftsstelle Senatssaal der Humboldt-Universität Berlin, Unter den Linden 6 http://www.helmholtz.de/aktuelles/veranstaltungen/
April 26-27	**29. international Veterinary Congress** Bad Staffelstein, Germany http://www.amtstieraerzte.de/index.php?option=com_simplecalendar&controller=simplecalendar&view=detail&id=4
April 28-30	**International Conference on Bioscience, Biotechnology and Biochemistry** Rome, Italy www.waset.org/conference/2010/rome/icbbb/index.php
April 30 – May 2	**War and Peace** 7th Global Conference, Interdisciplinary Net, Prague http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/probing-theboundaries/hostile-and-violence/war-virtual-war-human-security/call-for-papers/
May 2-5	**International conference on Bioethics Education: Contents, Methods, Trends** Canaan Spa, Zefat, Israel www.isas.co.il/bioethics2010/index.php
May 3-7	**18. European Biomass Conference and Exhibition** Lyon, Frankreich http://www.conference-biomass.com/
May 6-7	**Martha Nussbaum, Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice** International Conference, Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice, University of Nottingham Tony.burns@nottingahm.ac.uk
May 23-27	**3rd International Conference – The Impact of Environmental Conditions – Animal Welfare, Pollutions and Economics** National Research Institute of Animal Production Cracow/Balice Poland http://www.enviconf.izoo.krakow.pl/
May 26	**2nd European Symposium on Porcine Health Management** Pig Health, Performance and Welfare University of Veterinary Medicine Hannover, Germany For more information, please visit our web site: http://www.esphm.tiho-bakum.de

May 27-29	**European Society for Aesthetics Conference 2010** Undine, Italy www.eurosa.org
June 2-6	**Food In Bloom : Cross pollination and cultivation of food systems, cultures and methods** Association for the study of Food and Society Indiana University, Bloomington, India http://food-culture.org/conference.php
June 8	**Bio Energy Conference & Exhibition 2010 Bio Energy and Renewable Energy Conference** Prince George, British Columbia, Canada http://www.bioenergyconference.org/
June 9-11	**Risky Entanglements? Contemporary research cultures imagined and practised** University of Vienna http://sciencestudies.univie.ac.at/conference2010
June 10-12	**Agricultural History society - Annual meeting** Winter Park, Florida, United States http://www.aghistorysociety.org/
June 10-13	**A New Global Morality?** The Politics of Human Rights and Humanitarianism in the 1970s Freiburg, Germany http://www.frias.uni-freiburg.de/history/
June 20-25	**NanoAgri 2010 - International Conference on Food and Agricultural Applications of Nanotechnologies** São Carlos, São Paulo, Brazil http://www.nanoagri2010.com
June 25-28	**Feminism, Science, and Values** XIV. Symposium, International Association of Women Philosophers www.japh-philo.org
June 27 – July 2	**Vulnerability, Risk and Complexity: Impacts of Global Change on Human Habitats** Leipziger KUBUS, Germany Prof. Dr. Sigrun Kabisch, Department of Urban and Environmental Sociology, UFZ, Leipzig, Germany http://www.iaps2010.ufz.de/

June 30 – July 2	**3rd Biennial Global Ethics Conference - Global Ethics: 10 years into the millennium** University of the West of England, Bristol, UK http://www.igea.ugent.be/index.php?id=2&type=content
July 1-4	**The 12th IAHAIO Conference in Stockholm 2010** People and Animals: For Life www.iahaio2010.com
July 5-6	**The British Sociological Association** 2nd BSA Food Study Group Conference The British Library Conference Centre, London, UK http://www.britsoc.co.uk/events/food/htm
July 14-16	**ICFEB 2010 : "International Conference on Food Engineering and Biotechnology"** Bali, Indonesia http://www.waset.org/conferences/2010/bali/icfeb/index.php
July 28-31	**10th World Congress of Bioethics: Bioethics in a Globalised World** The Division of Ethics of Science and Technology Sector for Social and Human Sciences UNESCO Suntec Singapore International Convention and Exhibition Centre, Singapore http://www.bioethics-singapore.org/wcb2010/
August 11-14	**Experience in Philosophical Practice** 10th International Conference on Philosophical Practice, Leiden www.icpp.10org
August 19-22	**European Society for Research in Ethics – On Morals, Markets and Money- Economic and Business Ethics Revisited** http://societasethica.info
September 16-18	**Eursafe 2010** 9th Congress of the European Society for Agricultural and Food Ethics - Global Food Security: Ethical and Legal Challenges University of Deusto, Bilbao, ES www.eursafe2010.es
September 22-24	**ConSoil 2010 - Management of Soil, Groundwater & Sediment** Salzburg Congress, Austria UFZ- Deltares/TNO http://www.consoil.de/

September 30	**'Verd'italia': new horizons of agroenergy and biofuels for an eco-sustainable economy**. New Rome Fair Centre, Rome, Italy http://www.zeroemissionrome.eu/en/conf_2009.asp?fiera=BIO
October 3-8	**Greenhouse Gases and Animal Agriculture Conference** Banff, Alberta, Canada http://www.ggaa2010.org/
October 7-8	**GLOBALGAP Summit 2010** London, Europe, United Kingdom http://www.summit2010.org
November 8-9	**Mensch-Tier Beziehung: Neue wissenschaftliche Perspektiven** Tutzing, Germany Contact: herwig.grimm@elkb.de
November 15-20	**11th International Symposium on the Biosafety of Genetically Modified Organisms (ISBGMO)** Buenos Aires, Argentina http://www.isbr.info/?q=node/133

Contacts

Executive secretariat: **Paul den Besten**	Royal Netherlands Society of Agricultural Sciences, P.O. Box 79, NL-6700 AB Wageningen, The Netherlands paul.denbesten@wur.nl
EurSafe Membership Administration: **Bureau De Beek**	Parkweg 27 NL-2585 JH The Hague The Netherlands tel. (+31) (0)70 4162943, fax (+3 1) (0)70 4162959, info@eursafe.ledenadmin.nl
Executive committee	
President: **Matthias Kaiser**	National Committee for Research Ethics in Science and Technology, Norway matthias.kaiser@etikkom.no
Secretary: **Franck L.B. Meijboom**	Utrecht University, the Netherlands F.L.B.Meijboom@uu.nl
Treasurer: **Jos Metz**	Wageningen University, The Netherlands jos.metz@wur.nl
Vice-president: **Kate Millar**	University of Nottingham, United Kingdom, kate.millar@nottingham.ac.uk

Editor and theme next issue

Herwig Grimm	"Between kopenhagen and Bilbao: EurSafe members and projects on climate change and food security"

Deadline for the next issue: May 15, 2010

You are kindly invited to send any relevant contributions, conference calls, publication reviews, etc. to the editors.