



Contents

Editorial	1
Thematic Session – ‘ <i>Naturalizing Ethics</i> ’	2
Books and Publications	11
EurSafe Executive Committee Update	12
Conferences 2012	13
Contact	15

Editorial



Dear EurSafe Members,

It is my pleasure to present you the June issue of EurSafe News. It focuses on “naturalizing ethics”. At least two reasons were influential to choose this topic: First, looking at the debates in animal ethics, empirical disciplines like animal welfare science and more recent neuroscience and cognitive biology have gained more and more significance. Obviously, empirical knowledge plays a major role when the moral status of animals is argued for or when the question arises how we can live up to our moral duties towards animals. Secondly, the life sciences and their striking story of success not only brought solutions to problems but also new problems. In animal ethics and in many other fields – for instance medical ethics, agricultural ethics, and food ethics – new developments gave rise to a number of ethical questions and conflicts. Since the early 1990s, topics such as genetically modifying animals, cloning animals or the designing of chimeras have made it necessary to develop new answers in animal ethics.

The mentioned empirical disciplines provide valuable knowledge that can be utilized in animal ethics on the one hand and raise new issues in animal ethics on the other hand. Undoubtedly, empirical sciences have great impact on the work of ethicists. Looking at the debate more closely, it even seems as if ethics cannot do without them anymore. Therefore, the aim of this EurSafe News issue is to scrutinize the role of natural science in ethics and whether and how ethics is or can be “naturalized”. What in particular can empirical sciences contribute to ethics? Where are the limits in the process of “naturalizing ethics”? Is the normative reducible to the empirical? And if so, what – if anything – do we lose?

I am very happy to introduce two authors that took on the challenge to discuss some of these questions within the limits of a Newsletter. Kirsten Schmidt is the first contributor in the “thematic section”. She has been working as a philosopher on animal ethics and published several serviceable papers and a profound book on the various connections of ethics and science. In her corresponding papers and a book she focuses on ethical questions stemming from new possibilities in genetic engineering and the normative aspects in animal welfare science. The second author is Ludwig Huber. He has been conducting research in cognitive biology for more than 20 years. As a natural scientist with a background in philosophy he specialized in comparative cognition.

One of his projects with turtles (!) even brought him the IG Nobel Prize, that – according to the website – honors achievements that first make people laugh and then make them think.

The standard sections of the Newsletter are, as always, included; a message from the EurSafe Board about the EurSafe 2012 Conference and the latest information on conferences and calls for EU funding can be found after the feature articles.

The next issue will be edited by Bernice Bovenkerk. Please send all contributions by September 1st, 2012.

Wishing you a relaxed summer!

Herwig Grimm, Issue-editor

Thematic Section

'Naturalizing Ethics'

Kirsten Schmidt,
Ruhr University Bochum,
Germany

Naturalization as basic requirement for ethical research

At first glance, moral philosophy and natural sciences seem to be neatly separated domains of research: While natural sciences deal with what is, moral philosophy deals with what ought to be. However, due to the gain in biological and neurological knowledge about the human capacity and motivation to act morally, the call for a naturalization of ethics is getting louder. The aim of my paper is to show that naturalization is a basic requirement for ethical research – but only if it is linked to a normative and non-naturalizable framework.

What does it mean to naturalize ethics? The first step to answer this question is to make clear what "ethics" means. As a philosophical discipline, ethics is usually divided into metaethics and normative ethics. While metaethics mainly seeks to understand the nature of moral judgments and the theoretical meaning and function of ethical terms like "morality", "good" or "bad", normative ethics addresses questions like "which action is good or bad?" or "why should people act morally?". Moreover, normative ethics in a wide sense not only searches for moral rules and norms and tries to give them an argumentative foundation. It also deals with the application of these norms. Therefore, this branch of philosophical ethics is crucial not only on an academic level, but also for the solution of moral problems that we meet in everyday life: How should I act in a given situation? And would it be morally wrong to act otherwise?

To *naturalize* these questions means to join philosophical ethics to the realm of natural (that is: empirical) sciences like biology or neurology, or even stronger: to reformulate ethics as a part of natural sciences. The goal of this latter version of naturalized ethics "is to show that norms are natural, and that they arise from and are justified by purely natural processes" (Casebeer 2003, 843). Naturalization programs can focus on different ethical questions, for instance, the question of the scope of the moral domain: Who are the moral agents and moral patients of a moral action, that is, who can act morally (or unmorally) and which kinds of entities are possible objects of such an action? One example for

naturalization on this level is James Barham's claim that we should expand the concept of normative agency onto every living being because normative agency is an essential property of life as such (Barham 2012). Although this is rather a naturalization of normativity than of ethics, Barham's approach can be interpreted as a first step in the direction of projects that try to naturalize ethics by analyzing concepts like moral agency from an evolutionary or cognitive perspective, for example William D. Casebeer's attempt to connect moral cognition and neurobiology (Casebeer 2003) or William A. Rottschaefer's program for the scientific naturalization of ethics that relies on moral agency as a central feature of human persons (Rottschaefer 2000). Rottschaefer uses current findings in socio-biology, developmental psychology and social cognitive theory to answer the question what moral agency is and how it is acquired, activated and justified. Especially the last aspect of his program, the justification of moral agency, is problematic from the point of view of moral philosophy because although Rottschaefer explicitly focuses on metaethics, he draws conclusions with far-reaching consequences for normative ethics as well: "In the naturalistic model of justification of moral beliefs, moral truth is considered to be the end or goal of moral belief formation. Some of the processes by which moral beliefs are formed and acquired are due to cognitive mechanisms and processes that reliably achieve that goal. *These mechanisms and processes can serve as justifiers of moral beliefs. They provide good reasons for holding a belief*" (Rottschaefer 2000, 279, emphasis added).

I think that Rottschaefer's attempt to naturalize ethics (as well as Casebeer's claim that norms are justified by neurobiological processes) goes too far at this point because he confuses the descriptive and the normative level of ethical research. Many scientific disciplines like neurobiology, psychology, evolutionary biology or sociology deal with ethical issues in a purely descriptive way. Given this interpretation, to naturalize ethics means to ask questions like: Why *do* people actually act in a way that is called moral (or altruistic) in a specific culture, even if it might be against their self-interests? And why *can* they act morally, that is, how did the human capacity of moral agency develop in the evolutionary history of mankind and how is it acquired in ontogeny? This version of the project of "naturalizing ethics" is rather unproblematic because it pursues legitimate scientific goals. To find the evolutionary, developmental or neurological basis for the emergence of moral agency in human beings or the cultural or biological meaning of a certain moral rule is surely interesting from a sociological, historical, psychological, biological or even from a metaethical perspective.

However, it is far less interesting from the perspective of normative ethics because it tells us nothing about the moral validity or the appropriate application of a particular behavior or norm, that is, about the question how we *should* act. The problem is that authors like Rottschaefer or Casebeer tend to downplay the distinction between descriptive and normative ethical questions and understand naturalization not only as a descriptive but also as a normative project. In doing so, they have to be very careful because bridging the logical gap between the questions how we *do* act morally and how we *should* act morally by pointing to empirical facts alone is to commit what philosophers call a naturalistic fallacy. To say what is *is* a descriptive statement, while to say *what ought to be* is a normative statement. And one cannot turn a descriptive statement into a normative one by simply declaring natural occurrences as morally good. Most modern naturalists are

fully aware of this is/ought-problem. However, notwithstanding their claims to offer a naturalistic solution, naturalists cannot entirely get rid of the crucial objection that naturalization does not provide an adequate *justification* for moral rules. It might be true that the reason why people use to call murder of an innocent human being morally bad lies in the evolutionary and cultural history of human communities – but this is only an explanation for the actual usage of the concepts “bad” and “murder”, and not a rationale for the validity of the moral norm “You shall not kill an innocent human being”. In other words: Naturalization cannot provide a moral framework that guides our actions even beyond the orientation for prudential goals. And this holds not only for moral realists who believe in the existence of lasting moral rules that are laid down by some “supernatural” force or will, but for every ethical theory. One might interpret, for instance, the development of animal ethics in philosophy and society as the beginning of a change in a particular part of the moral framework in Western societies, including the implementation of new moral rules like “You shall not kill an innocent sentient being”. The decision of an individual moral agent to adopt a zoocentric instead of an anthropocentric framework might indeed be influenced by new empirical findings, particularly from the biological sciences. However, neither the individual decision nor the moral rules that follow from the zoocentric position can be *deduced* from empirical facts – a change of ethical perspective requires a deliberate act that cannot be naturalized. And to obey a moral rule that we chose to obey might in case require overcoming our natural predispositions, although not our natural capabilities.

Nevertheless, empirical findings are crucial on the normative level. But instead of giving an entire explanation or grounding, natural sciences provide valuable information for the process of finding moral rules and applying them in an appropriate way. One basic reason for this is that every moral rule has to be performable to have any practical influence. And since “human nature sets limits on what our obligations are by limiting our capacities” (Rottschaefer 2000, 260), natural sciences play at least a *negative* normative role because they help to figure out what human beings cannot do.

But as provider of information, natural sciences also have a significant *positive* role in the whole field of philosophical ethics, especially in the context of bioethics. Once again, animal ethics is a good example for the necessity to incorporate scientific knowledge on different levels of ethical research:

1. Only empirical findings make it possible to decide if an animal of a particular species fulfills the empirical conditions for the attribution of moral status within the framework of a certain ethical theory, for instance sentience, rationality or self-awareness. A recent example is the growing evidence for pain perception in fish (Braithwaite 2010). As sentient beings that can experience pain, fish would deserve full moral status in pathocentric ethical theories like utilitarianism.

2. Treating a living being with respect for its moral status requires a deep empirical knowledge of the being's capacities and needs. If we try to figure out the morally right way to interact with an animal of a certain species we need to know which aspects of this interaction can have a beneficial or detrimental effect on the animal. Only with the help of empirical research in scientific disciplines like animal welfare science or animal psychology,

animal ethicists can specify criteria for an animal's well-being and flourishing that can serve as guidelines to establish concrete rules for moral action.

3. The former two aspects show how moral reasoning is influenced by empirical knowledge about the animal as a living being with specific needs. However, ethical research is also affected by scientific knowledge about *us*, that is, about human beings as moral agents, because it helps us to understand why we sometimes tend to see "imaginary" moral problems while we neglect other moral problems that are perfectly real.

The outright rejection of artificial interspecies chimeras, organisms with cells from different embryological origins, is an example for the first kind of mistake. For many people, the creation of chimeras in a scientific laboratory is morally wrong *per se*. One reason for this might be a misguided conception of the ontological status of these beings within nature. In contrast to widely held beliefs, chimerism as such is not unnatural, even in highly complex organisms. Many mammal twins, most frequently cattle, are blood chimeras and in marmoset twins even germ-line tissues were found to be chimeric (Ross et al. 2007). Furthermore, the generation of artificial interspecies chimeras by human beings is not restricted to genetic engineering technologies but has a long history (think, for example, of grafting). Without a sound knowledge of this scientific background, neither ethicist nor layperson can come to a balanced moral judgment because chimeric research seems to be unnatural from the outset. And what is more, focusing on the putative intrinsic wrongness of the whole research project can obstruct the view on real moral problems, for instance, on the question if genetically altering an animal is morally permissible.

4. Neurobiological knowledge can also help to understand and maybe overcome the human tendency to neglect some moral problems in favor of other ones. For example, why do most people act in fundamentally different ways towards animals that they regard as livestock respectively pet, even if the animals belong to the same or to closely related species? As neurobiological research shows, the reasons why we eat the former and pamper the latter are not only social or cultural. Cognitive neuroscientist and philosopher Joshua Greene mentions a feature of the human mind that is particularly important for our motivation to act morally towards human persons: "The way our brains are wired up, needy people who are 'up close and personal' push our emotional buttons, whereas those who are out of sight languish out of mind" (Greene 2003, 849). Likewise, personal contact with *animals* is crucial for our motivation to act in a way that we already recognize, on a rational level, as morally right when we decide to take into account the basic interests of *all* sentient beings who are affected by our actions, be it pet or farm animal. Being close does not only mean closeness in a literal sense that allows for communication and interaction between human being and animal on a personal and individual level, but also intellectual closeness in the sense of knowledge: The more we know about an animal, as an individual and as a member of a particular species, the closer the human-animal-relation can become and the more we are motivated to act morally not only towards fellow human beings but also towards animals. Insofar, empirical facts can be the trigger that converts theoretical moral judgment into practical moral action.

All things considered, scientific knowledge is a necessary requirement for ethical research and has to be taken into account

in every part of ethics as a scientific discipline. The enrichment of ethics with findings from the natural sciences is essential not only for the practicability of moral norms but also to make sure that living beings with moral status are treated in a morally adequate way. However, to have an impact on the normative level, the project of naturalization in ethics has to be linked to a normative framework that can be supported by but not deduced from empirical facts.

Research for this paper was supported by the German Research Council (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, grant SCHM 2638/1-1).

References

Barham, J. (2012): Normativity, agency, and life. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences* 43, 92-103.

Braithwaite, V. (2010): *Do Fish Feel Pain?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Casebeer, W. D. (2003): Moral cognition and its neural constituents. *Nature Reviews Neuroscience* 4, 841-846.

Greene, J. (2003): From neural 'is' to moral 'ought': What are the moral implications of neuroscientific moral psychology? *Nature Reviews Neuroscience* 4, 847-850.

Ross, C. N.; French, J. A.; Ortí, G. (2007): Germ-line chimerism and paternal care in marmosets (*Callithrix kuhlii*). *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 104/15, 6278–6282.

Rottschaefer, W. A. (2000): Naturalizing ethics: The biology and psychology of moral agency. *Zygon* 35/2, 253-286.

Kirsten Schmidt,
Ruhr University Bochum,
Germany,
Kirsten.schmidt@rub.de

Ludwig Huber,
University of Veterinary
Medicine, Vienna, Austria

Naturalizing Ethics?

An enduring intellectual challenge is the question of whether the natural sciences, especially biology, can help solving philosophical problems. Opponents have been those who think, like Wittgenstein, that "*Darwin's theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other hypothesis in natural science*" (namely nothing) and those who maintain, like E.O. Wilson, that the time might have come for "*ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized*". Of course, the area in which the significance of Darwinian ideas has been most hotly debated is morality. As Philip Kitcher famously said: "*Does Darwinism reveal how human societies ought to be constructed, or how human beings ought to behave? Does it finally debunk morality? Or is it simply irrelevant to our understanding of morality?*" (Kitcher 2009).

How can we achieve a fair compromise here? How can biology inform moral philosophy and vice versa? Are there ways in which empirical data might play a useful, if only partial, role in philosophical discussion? Like many biologists I am inclined to say

that biology can make indeed a very fruitful contribution, which of course is a *descriptive*, not *normative* account of morality. In particular, I consider the evolutionary understanding of our species as relevant to the tracing of all aspects of human history, including the history of our social systems, our culture and our morality.

But does this historical understanding have any consequence for the evaluation or derivation of substantive new ethical principles? We are only too familiar with the difficulty (or fallacy) of inferring normative statements from factual statements. Isn't the human mind limitless in its power to create new thoughts? Aren't we free to want whatever we think and to do whatever we want? "*Must we acquiesce in the propensities attributed to us or to aspire to the ends that are singled out?*" (Kitcher 2009)

The most common way in which ethics have been "naturalized" is by investigating the evolutionary roots of human morality. This endeavour starts with two premises. Firstly, humans have not been uniquely endowed with special attributes (including a moral sense) by divine grace alone. Secondly, morality is not a fiction but firmly grounded in both *socio-cognitive abilities* – like the understanding of the wants and needs of others – and other-regarding *emotions* like empathy and sympathy. There is accumulating empirical evidence that human moral judgements are co-determined by unconscious processes ("moral intuitions") and conscious reflections on which actions (including wilful defaults) are justified or not. Unfortunately, many moral philosophers disregard the first part and focus only on the latter, "genuine" part of morality.

There is no doubt, humans are "*hypersocial*" animals, relying on many physiological and psychological processes to establish and maintain group living, culture being only one of it. In the social realm we find endless patterns of similarity in the tree of life. Many non-human animals behave in ways that share a number of important aspects with human behaviour. These similarities are especially evident if non-human animals are compared with children, elderly people, people deciding under pressure (the so called "fast and frugal decisions"), hunter-gatherer societies and our extinct relatives and ancestors, the other hominid species. Why is this so? What causes these similarities?

When it comes to morality, the essential transition is the one from social to *prosocial* behavior. Prosocial tendencies include acts of help or assistance to others. Together they constitute *cooperative* and *altruistic* behavior (Brosnan & Bshary, 2010). Konrad Lorenz used the term "moral-analogous" to emphasize the obvious, non-accidental similarities of prosocial behaviors between humans and some non-human species. In the last decades, primatologists and ethologists discovered and investigated a broad variety of behaviors that could be labelled "cooperative" and – in few cases – also "prosocial" (Silk 2007; de Waal & Suchak 2010). Many surprising discoveries are the result, especially how widespread these behaviors are in the animal kingdom. For instance, cleaner fish have been found to cooperate in a mutualistic manner, and even more exciting, they show sensitivity to the presence of an audience in order to maintain a cooperative reputation (Bshary & Grutter 2006). From a biological ("Darwinian") point of view even these altruistic acts, which are per definition costly and disadvantageous for the donator, must on average and in the long run produce fitness-increasing behavior.

Modern biologists don't stop with a historical or comparative

description but seek to uncover the mechanisms of behavior. They ask how these cooperative and altruistic acts are regulated. Which set of psychological rules, which intrinsic motivations and which response rules to extrinsic stimuli have emerged during evolution, favored by natural selection? Because natural selection is a slow and “opportunistic” process, maintaining successful traits as long as possible and only slightly modifying them over time, we find similarities as patterns of divergence (homology) and convergence (analogy) in closely related species. This is not only true for anatomical or physiological traits but also for cognitive and emotional ones (Fitch et al. 2010).

In human foragers (hunter-gatherer societies), prosocial acts include voluntary food sharing with both kin and non-kin, allomaternal child care, division of labor, care for the sick, injured and elderly, information donation (teaching), cooperative hunting and collective warfare. Prosocial acts occur within (mostly) and between family units within local groups (Gurven 2004; Hrdy 2009). Counterintuitively, some species more distantly related to humans than great apes show striking parallels with humans concerning cooperation. In particular, voluntary food sharing, teaching, allomaternal care and care for the injured are more common in cooperative breeders such as callitrichid monkeys, social carnivores such as meerkats and canines than in great apes. It has been suggested that a high intrinsic prosocial motivation evolved convergently in *cooperative breeders*, probably because of the risk of neglect of unattended offspring and the need for active provisioning to maintain fast growth levels. The adoption of cooperative breeding typically leads to the formation of family units, within which prosocial acts are dispensed more freely because they generally benefit close kin or pair-bonded partners (Chapais 2008; Jaeggi et al. 2010).

What are the cornerstones of such intrinsic prosocial motivation? The famous primatologist Frans de Waal proposes that the human capacity to act well at least sometimes, rather than badly all the time, has its evolutionary origins in emotions that we share with other animals – in involuntary (unchosen, pre-rational) and physiologically obvious (thus observable) responses to the circumstances of others (de Waal et al. 2006). A fundamentally important form of emotional response is *empathy*. This proximate mechanism for prosocial behavior that makes one individual share another’s emotional state is biased the way one would predict from evolutionary theories of cooperation (i.e. by kinship, social closeness and reciprocation). There is increasing evidence in non-human primates (and other mammals) for this proximate mechanism as well as for the unselfish, spontaneous nature of the resulting prosocial tendencies as reflected in the way they support each other in fights, hunt together, share food and console victims of aggression (de Waal & Suchak 2010). However, there is now also evidence for individualized social support in common ravens, including consolation, i.e. post-conflict affiliation directed from a bystander to the recipient of aggression (Fraser & Bugnyar 2011) and long-term memory of the value of relationships (Boeckle & Bugnyar 2012).

Importantly, empathy is not a uniform trait across the animal kingdom but comes in at least three different shades. It is considered as the capacity to (i) be affected by and share the emotional state of another (e.g. emotional contagion), (ii) assess the causes for the other’s state and/or (iii) identify with the other, adopting his or her perspective (de Waal 2008). At a more

advanced level, however, emotional empathy can yield *sympathy*, that is, the recognition that the observed partner has situationally specific wants or needs that are different from the observer's. Current research aims to understand whether non-human animals also share forms of sympathetic concern with us.

A crucial element for the evolution of advanced forms of cooperation, including both cognitive and emotional propensities, is the sensitivity to others' efforts and payoffs compared with one's own costs and gains. *Inequity aversion* is thought to be the driving force behind unselfish motivated punishment in humans constituting a powerful device for the enforcement of cooperation. Primatologists showed that capuchin monkeys refuse to participate in cooperative problem-solving tasks if they witness a conspecific obtaining a more attractive reward for the same effort (Brosnan & de Waal 2003). We found experimental evidence also in dogs (Range et al. 2009).

Much of the debate among philosophers and biologists over human uniqueness has centred on the question of whether any non-human animal is capable of developing anything like a real "Theory of Mind" (Call & Tomasello 2008). The possessor of this special socio-cognitive capacity is able to imagine the contents of another being's mind as different from one's own and thereby infers the wants and needs of the other. There is a wealth of experimental data now from many non-human animals being capable of "*mindreading*" to various degrees. Again, not only chimpanzees, but even ravens infer from "what the other has seen", "what the other knows" and "what it would do next" (Heinrich & Bugnyar 2007). Many philosophers are now inclined to accept these discoveries as the evolutionary basis or prerequisite for moral reason.

It would be foolish to doubt that humans are nevertheless different in many respects. First of all, their prosocial attitudes can be more intense and far-reaching, suggesting that prosociability has been under stronger positive selection during human evolution. Within human societies, kin networks extend far beyond the family unit (Chapais 2008). Even when applied to non-relatives, a high prosocial motivation may be beneficial if it sends a costly signal or serves to maintain one's good reputation. Nevertheless, even if human prosocial behavior is considerably more elaborate than that of any non-human animal, it is continuous with non-human behavior. Given this continuity of good nature, there is no need to imagine morality being mysteriously added to an immoral core.

What remains then to be added to achieve full morality? The roots of human moral uniqueness lie in our ability to take an *impersonal* view of our own doings and to invent co-operative *principles*. The main proposition here is its *universal* nature. Non-human animals do not *universalize* their good behavior, but humans do. Philosophers point out that the universalization of the set of beings (all persons or all creatures with interests) to which moral duties are owed is treated as conceptually feasible by humans. And it is at least sometimes put into practice by them. True "moralists" sharply distinguish animal behavior motivated by emotion from human *cognitive* morality. The latter, they say, must be based on self-consciousness about the propriety of one's proposed line of action (akin to the Kantian conception of self-governance). So, now we are finally at the important distinction. Philosophers prefer a self-consciously *normative* account of morality as how people *ought* to act, while biologists and psychologists are more interested

in a *descriptive* account of how most of us *actually do* act most of the time (these different accounts are nicely discussed in “*Primates and Philosophers*”; de Waal et al. 2006).

In conclusion, morality is a natural phenomenon. It has a core (emotion-motivated prosocial behavior) that can be (easily) naturalized. Added on to it is the human capacity to *reflect* own interests in the mirror of the other, to *extrapolate* and *reason* about universal norms and to *enunciate* normative ideals. This part is less easily naturalized. However, if there is continuity between biological and cultural evolution, with self-consciousness, language and reasoning being a result of an intricate interplay of both, it would come into reach. Anyone still for mysteries?

References

Boeckle, M., & Bugnyar, T. (2012). Long-term memory for affiliates in ravens. *Curr Biol.* in press.

Brosnan, S. F. & Bshary, R. 2010 Cooperation and deception: from evolution to mechanisms. *Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B* 365, 2593 – 2598.

Brosnan S. F. & de Waal F. B. M. (2003) Monkeys reject unequal pay. *Nature* 425, 297–299.

Bshary, R. & Grutter, A. S. 2006 Image scoring and cooperation in a cleaner fish mutualism. *Nature* 441, 975–978.

Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later. *Trends Cogn Sci*, 12(5), 187-192.

Chapais, B. 2008 Primeval kinship: how pair-bonding gave birth to human society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

de Waal F. B. M. (2008) Putting the altruism back into altruism: the evolution of empathy. *Ann. Rev. Psychol.* 59, 279 – 300.

de Waal F. B. M. & Suchak, M. (2010) Prosocial primates: selfish and unselfish motivations. *Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B* 365, 2711-2722.

de Waal, F. B. M., Macedo, S., Ober, J., & Wright, R. (2006). *Primates and philosophers: how morality evolved*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Fitch, W. T., Huber, L., & Bugnyar, T. (2010). Social cognition and the evolution of language: constructing cognitive phylogenies. *Neuron*, 65(6), 795-814.

Fraser, O. N., & Bugnyar, T. (2011). Ravens reconcile after aggressive conflicts with valuable partners. *PLoS One*, 6(3), e18118.

Gurven, M. 2004 To give and to give not: the behavioral ecology of human food transfers. *Behav. Brain Sci.* 27, 543 – 583.

Heinrich, B., & Bugnyar, T. (2007). Just how smart are ravens? *Sci Am*, 296(4), 64–71.

Hrdy, S. 2009 Mothers and others: the evolutionary origins of mutual understanding. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Jaeggi, A. V., Burkart, J. M. & Van Schaik, C. P. 2010 On the psychology of cooperation in humans and other primates: combining the natural history and experimental evidence of prosociality. *Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B* 365, 2723-2735.

Kitcher, P. (2009) Giving Darwin his Due. Online (<http://www.columbia.edu/~psk16>), download 18 May 2009.

Ludwig Huber,
University of Veterinary
Medicine, Vienna, University of
Vienna, Medical University of
Vienna, Austria,
Ludwig.huber@vetmeduni.ac.at

Range, F., Horn, L., Viranyi, Z., & Huber, L. (2009). The absence of reward induces inequity aversion in dogs. *PNAS* 106, 340–345.

Silk, J. B. 2007 Empathy, sympathy, and prosocial preferences in primates. In *Oxford handbook of evolutionary psychology* (eds R. I. M. Dunbar & L. Barrett), pp. 115–126. New York: Oxford University Press.

Books and Publications

Books

Why Calories Count: From Science to Politics (California Studies in Food and Culture)

Authors: Marion Nestle, Malden Nesheim

Hardcover: 304 pages

Publisher: University of California Press; 1 edition (April 18, 2012)

Language: English

ISBN-10: 0520262883

ISBN-13: 978-0520262881

Tomatoland: How Modern Industrial Agriculture Destroyed Our Most Alluring Fruit

Author: Barry Estabrook

Paperback: 256 pages

Publisher: Andrews McMeel Publishing; Original edition (April 24, 2012)

Language: English

ISBN-10: 1449423450

ISBN-13: 978-1449423452

The Weight of the Nation: Surprising Lessons About Diets, Food, and Fat from the Extraordinary Series from HBO Documentary Films

Authors: John Hoffman, Judith A. Salerno, Alexandra Moss, Harvey V. Fineberg (Afterword), Kelly D. Brownell (Foreword)

Hardcover: 224 pages

Publisher: St. Martin's Press; First Edition edition (April 24, 2012)

Language: English

ISBN-10: 1250014735

ISBN-13: 978-1250014733

Environmental Ethics

Author: Joseph R. Des Jardins

Paperback: 304 pages

Publisher: Wadsworth Publishing; 5 edition (January 6, 2012)

Language: English

ISBN-10: 1133049974

ISBN-13: 978-1133049975

Four Fish: The Future of the Last Wild Food

Author: Paul Greenberg

Paperback: 304 pages

Publisher: Penguin (Non-Classics); Reprint edition (May 31, 2011)

Language: English

ISBN-10: 014311946X

ASIN: B0064X7PR8

Ethics and Animals: An Introduction (Cambridge Applied Ethics)

Author: Lori Gruen

Paperback: 250 pages

Publisher: Cambridge University Press; 1 edition (March 14, 2011)

Language: English

ISBN-10: 0521717736

ISBN-13: 978-0521717731

Hot: Living Through the Next Fifty Years on Earth

Author: Mark Hertsgaard

Hardcover: 352 pages

Publisher: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt; 1 edition (January 19, 2011)

Language: English

ISBN-10: 0618826122

ISBN-13: 978-0618826124

Animal Rights: What Everyone Needs to Know

Author: Paul Waldau

Paperback: 256 pages

Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA (January 4, 2011)

Language: English

ISBN-10: 019973996X

ISBN-13: 978-0199739967

Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals

Authors: Marc Bekoff, Jessica Pierce

Paperback: 208 pages

Publisher: University Of Chicago Press (May 1, 2010)

Language: English

ISBN-10: 0226041638

ISBN-13: 978-0226041636

Food Politics: How the Food Industry Influences Nutrition and Health, Revised and Expanded Edition (California Studies in Food and Culture)

Author: Marion Nestle

Paperback: 510 pages

Publisher: University of California Press; Second Edition, Revised edition (October 15, 2007)

Language: English

ISBN-10: 0520254031

ISBN-13: 978-0520254039

EurSafe Executive Committee Update

Welcome to the Summer 2012 issue of the EurSafe newsletter. It has been a busy few months for the Society, with the highlight for many of us being the EurSafe 2012 Congress ("*Climate Change and Sustainable Development: Ethical Perspectives on Land Use and Food Production*") held in Tübingen, Germany. We were fortunate enough to not only have a stimulating Congress programme, but also wonderful weather as we enjoy the delights of the city of Tübingen. For those of you who could not join us the Conference book is now available from Wageningen Press (please see their website). We would like to take this opportunity to thank all of our speakers and those of you who contributed to the congress programme, and particularly our wonderful hosts Prof Thomas Potthast, Simon Meisch and the team at Tübingen.

The Executive Committee is also delighted to announce the dates of the 11th EurSafe Congress that will be held in Uppsala, Sweden on 12-14 September 2013. Further information on the congress themes, venue and congress submission dates will be released in the September issue of the Newsletter.

We would like to wish you a warm and inspiring summer and we look forward to sending you further information on the Congress and new initiatives within the network in September. Please have a super summer!!!

Kate Millar on behalf of Executive Committee
June 2012

Conferences 2012

July 3-6

Minding Animals Conference
Utrecht University, The Netherlands
www.mindinganimals.com

July 7-8

Animal Law – Reflecting on European, American and Asian Concepts
Zurich, Switzerland
<http://www.rwi.uzh.ch/lehreforschung/postdocs/animallaw.html>

July 8-21

Global Sustainability Summer School
Potsdam, Germany
<http://www.gsss-potsdam.org/>

July 13-20

International Conference on Mass Data Analysis of Images and Signals
Berlin, Germany
<http://www.mda-signals.de>

July 18-20

Relocating Science and Technology. Global Knowledge, Traveling Technologies and Postcolonialism. Perspectives on Science and Technology Studies in the Global South
Halle, Germany
http://www.eth.mpg.de/cms/de/events/index.html_479060198.html

August 2-5

ICSA VII. World Congress: Brave New World? Genetic Engineering & Human Dignity
Pasadena, California, United States
<http://www.JIS3.org/icsavii.htm>

August 7-10

Biodiversity Asia 2012
Bangalore (Bengaluru), India
<http://www.scbasia2012.org/>

August 11-12

International Conference on Environment, Agriculture and Food Sciences (ICEAFS'2012) Phuket, Thailand
<http://psrcentre.org/listing.php?subcid=106&mode=detail>

August 29-31

Internationals Sustainability Conference 2012
Basel, Switzerland
<http://www.sustainabilityconference.ch>

September 2-5	UNESCO CHAIR IN BIOETHICS – 8th International Conference on Bioethics Education: Contents, Methods, Trends Tiberias, Israel http://www.isas.co.il/bioethics2012/
September 7-9	Tiergestützte Intervention im Fokus der Wissenschaften Dresden, Germany werden: http://tu-dresden.de/die_tu_dresden/fakultaeten/erzw/erzwiss/be/mtb/Tagung
September 9-21	Course on Animal Welfare Science, Ethics and Law St. Catharine's College, Cambridge, UK www.cawasel.com
September 10-14	In Vivo, ex Vivo, in Vitro, in Silico: Models in the Life Sciences. Geneva, Switzerland http://histmed.unige.ch/documents/call_for_applicationseaspls2012final.pdf
September 20-21	Kantian Ethics and Moral Life Antwerp, Belgium http://ugent.academia.edu/StijnVanImpe/Blog/16809/International-conference-KANTIAN-ETHICS-AND-MORAL-LIFE
September 21-23	Challenging Philosophy: Interdisciplinary problems and disciplinary philosophy Tübingen, Germany http://pin-net.gatech.edu/international_conference_2012.php
September 24-29	Summer School for Cultural and Literary Animal Studies Würzburg, Germany http://www.ndl1.germanistik.uni-wuerzburg.de/forschung/nachwuchsnetzwerk_cultural_and_literary_animal_studies/summer_school_clas/
October 4-5	Second International Conference on Food Studies Champaign, United States of America http://food-studies.com/conference-2012/
October 5-6	2012 Berlin Conference on Evidence for Sustainable Development. 11th Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change. Berlin, Germany http://www.berlinconference.org/2012/
October 11-12	The Precarious Alliance: The Ethics of Water Doylestown, United States of America http://precariousalliance.org/
October 17-20	Biennial Conference of the European Association for the Study of Science and Technology (EASST) 2012 Copenhagen, Denmark http://www.easst.net/conferences/easst2012.shtml
November 14-16	Conference: Biodiversity and Society: Societal dimensions of the conservation and utilisation of biological diversity Göttingen, Germany http://www.uni-goettingen.de/en/321424.html

Contacts

Executive secretariat
Saskia de Boer

Royal Netherlands Society of Agricultural Sciences, P.O. Box 79,
NL-6700 AB Wageningen, The Netherlands
saskia.deboer@wur.nl

**EurSafe Membership
Administration**
**Verenigingenbeheer
Nederland**

Pastoor Buyslaan 25, NL-2242 RJ Wassenaar, The Netherlands
tel. (+31) (0)70 4162940, fax (+3 1) (0)70 4162959,
info@eursafe ledenadmin.nl

President
Matthias Kaiser

Centre for the Study of the Sciences and the Humanities, University
of Bergen, Norway, matthias.kaiser@svt.uib.no

Secretary
Franck L.B. Meijboom

Utrecht University, the Netherlands
F.L.B.Meijboom@uu.nl

Treasurer
Anne-Marie Neeteson

Aviagen, The Netherlands
aneeteson@aviagen.com

Vice-president
Kate Millar

Centre for Applied Bioethics, University of Nottingham, United
Kingdom, kate.millar@nottingham.ac.uk

Members

Johan De Tavernier

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium,
johan.detavernier@theo.kuleuven.be

Helena Röcklinsberg

Swedish University of Agricultural Science, Sweden,
helena.rocklinsberg@hnh.slu.se

Leire Escajedo

University of the Basque Country, Spain,
leire.escajedo@ehu.es

Anna Olsson

Institute for Molecular and Cell Biology - IBMC, Portugal
olsson@ibmc.up.pt

Kristin Hagen

Europäische Akademie zur Erforschung von Folgen
wissenschaftlich-technischer Entwicklungen, Germany
kristin.hagen@ea-aw.de

Website

www.eursafe.org

EurSafe News

Chief-editor: Stefan Aerts

KAHO Sint-Lieven/K.U.Leuven, Belgium, stef.aerts@kahosl.be

Publications editor:
Assya Pascalev

Howard University, United States, director@bioethics.net

Editorial Board

Herwig Grimm

Institute TTN, Germany, herwig.grimm@elkb.de

Matias Pasquali

Matias.pasquali@gmail.com

Bernice Bovenkerk

Universiteit Utrecht, the Netherlands, b.bovenkerk@uu.nl

Raymond Anthony

University of Alaska Anchorage, US, ranthon1@uaa.alaska.edu

Kate Millar

University of Nottingham, United Kingdom,
kate.millar@nottingham.ac.uk

Christian Dürnberger

Editors and themes next issues

September 2012

Bernice Overkerk, b.bovenkerk@uu.nl

Deadline for the next issue: September 1, 2012

You are kindly invited to send any relevant contributions, conference calls, publication reviews, etc. to the editors.