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Editorial



Dear EurSafe Members,

It is my pleasure to send you this issue of EurSafe news. It was a long wait, but hopefully the interesting discussions you will find here will make up for it. This newsletter focuses on the Minding Animals conference that was held last summer in Utrecht, the Netherlands. This large international and interdisciplinary conference addressed all facets of the human-animal relationship. The conference was organised by the Ethics Institute and the Veterinary Department of Utrecht University in collaboration with Minding Animals International and brought together academics, animal activists and advocates, policy makers, artists, and others interested in the way humans deal with non-human animals. The scope of topics dealt with was too wide to give a complete impression of the whole conference here – almost 400 papers and 100 posters were presented on topics as wide ranging as veganism, animal biotechnology, the treatment of animals in the wild, the harm of death, aquaculture sustainability, cross-cultural perspectives on animals, the capabilities approach in animals ethics, sign language in primates, etc., etc. The conference was opened in style by John Coetzee, who was able to captivate his audience for more than an hour reading from an unpublished story about his protagonist Elizabeth Costello, called ‘The Old Woman and the Cats’, in which she questions the control humans wield over the reproductive life of animals. Plenary lectures were given by renowned philosophers, such as Christine Korsgaard, Peter Singer, Will Kymlicka, Dale Jamieson, and Julia Driver; sociologists, such as Harriet Ritvo and Paul Schnabel; animal cognition experts, such as Colin Allen; biologists, such as Marc Bekoff; and animal advocates, such as Jill Robinson.

For this newsletter, I have chosen to focus on one topic that I found particularly interesting and that several sessions were devoted to: animal capacities. Paula Droege writes about the - as she explains, not-so obvious - question of whether animals are conscious. Arguing that flexible behaviour provides an indication of animal consciousness, she elaborates four progressively more complex ways of demonstrating such behaviour. Next, Irina Meketa investigates the charge often levelled against researchers who try to establish, for example, whether animals are conscious, that they are being anthropomorphic, and ‘hence’ sentimental. This charge is not only simplistic, as it relies on a mistaken cognitive/affective dichotomy, but it also misrepresents research practice. After all, many scientists have a passion for their subject of research without being accused of sentimentality. In fact, an affective relation to one’s field of inquiry may

help the development of the research. Finally, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg and Herwig Grimm report on the workshop that was held during Minding Animals on socio-cognitive abilities in animals and their moral relevance.

But first, I will raise the question of why research about the capacities of animals is of interest to – and in my view should be paid more attention to by – animal ethicists.

I wish you a good Summer and hope to see you all in Uppsala in September!

Bernice Bovenkerk, Issue-editor

Thematic Section ‘Minding Animals’



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Animal capacities and ethics

Many EurSafe members are dealing with the welfare of farm animals in one way or another. When we are wondering how to implement welfare standards at the farm it is important to be aware that we are making all sorts of presuppositions, both moral and scientific. The question about welfare implementation is in fact the endpoint of a whole line of reasoning in which ethics and science interact and that is ultimately based in the view that animals have moral status. In other words, wanting to implement animal welfare standards, often presupposes that animals are part of the moral community, or that their interests matter in our moral decisions. I will briefly illustrate this line of reasoning, using the example of fish welfare.

Fish welfare can be implemented in many ways: we can, for example, kill fish more humanely or improve water quality and there may not always be enough resources to do both, so a choice has to be made that is in part a moral choice. Implementing welfare also presupposes that the value of fish welfare is weighed against other values such as public health and hygiene. In order to improve the welfare of fish it may be better to kill them at the farm, but this may raise public health issues. Making such choices, however, already presupposes that we know what welfare means, how we should define it, and also that we know how to measure it. The term welfare is an evaluative term, combining moral norms and scientific results. In the methods used to assess welfare many evaluative presuppositions are made as well. What should these measurements focus on? Health, growth, reproduction, frustration, fear, ability to display natural behaviour? And should we only focus on objectively measurable variables, such as cortisol levels, or should qualitative measures be included? In all these steps an interaction between ethics and science takes place. All these steps also assume that welfare is important in the first place and this raises the question why. For some moral theories welfare is more relevant than for others. The theories that take welfare as central presuppose that animals have the sort of capacities that constitute welfare. Sentience is a classical capacity that is mentioned, but perhaps more complex cognitive abilities are relevant too. What capacities are deemed morally relevant is dependent again on one's theoretical normative framework. In summary, then, ethicists cannot answer questions about moral status and animal welfare without scientific input, amongst other things about animal capacities, and neither can scientists answer questions about implementing and measuring welfare without ethical input.

So let's have a look at what animal capacities are relevant from the perspective of a number of different moral theories or approaches and what sort of questions arise within these different theories. At the risk of making a caricature of the different moral theories or approaches, I will very briefly say something about each theory and point out what they are looking for in an animal.

(I) Utilitarians argue that if an animal is sentient, in other words, if it has the capacity to suffer pain and enjoy pleasure it has interests. Sentience is a sufficient and necessary condition to possess moral status. According to some utilitarians, in particular Peter Singer, in our moral decisions we need to weigh the preferences of each individual with moral status equally. Also, he argues that when animals are self-conscious they have an interest in not being killed. Questions regarding animal capacities that are relevant are then: Which animals can experience pain? What other forms of suffering can occur (p.e. frustration, boredom)? What positive experiences do animals have? Should positive experiences always be defined as functional for survival, or can they be frivolous? Do animals play? Which animals have preferences? Which possess self-consciousness?

(II) According to deontologists, sentience is a necessary criterion for moral status, but not a sufficient one. More complex cognitive abilities are required as well. An animal has interests only if it can experience its life subjectively and if it has some sort of autonomy, such as preference autonomy, or if it has a psychosocial identity or unity over time. Questions that are relevant, on top of the ones utilitarians ask are: Which animals have desires, beliefs, and intentions? Are there species that act on the basis of some form of reasoning rather than mere inclination? Does an ability for cognitive learning imply being a subject of one's life? Do some species have capacities for moral behaviour? What could autonomy mean in animals?

(III) According to relational, care, or contextual ethics our commitments to animals are determined by our relationships to them and also their vulnerability and dependence on humans. The main question here is not what animals have moral status, but more practically how we should treat specific animals, and these animals come into the picture because of the relationship we have with them. So we have different obligations towards wild animals than towards domesticated animals, for example, because we have made a commitment to domesticated animals by bringing them into our sphere of influence. Questions that are relevant are: Can animals communicate and interact, within and across species? Can they build a relationship with humans? Does an ability for symbolic understanding by animals add to this?

(IV) According to the capabilities approach championed by Nussbaum, animals are agents seeking a flourishing existence. We have a duty to allow them to live the full potential of their life form, including love, grief, etc. This means, amongst other things, that social animals need to live in their social group to be able to flourish. Questions that are relevant are: Not only how cognitively, but also how socially complex are different animal species? The presumption seems to be that the more cognitively complex the more intricate an animal's capacity to flourish. It also means that an ability for cognitive learning may require zoo and farm animals to be provided with more challenging environmental enrichment.

(V) The approaches mentioned so far have all considered only capacities of individual animals to be relevant. However, on the group-

level capacities may emerge that transcend the capacities of individual animals. Collectively, animals can make decisions that transcend their own cognitive limitations. So, for example, if we think of a flock of birds, a swarm of insects or a school of fish, these have a much larger sensory range together than on their own and this enables them to respond better to the threat of a predator. Or we can think of termites that together build termite mounds that correspond to mathematical principles. Questions that are relevant if we want to approach animals at a group level are: Is there such a thing as collective cognition and if so, what does this mean for the attribution of moral status? Could we say that the individuals in such groups do not necessarily have interests and moral status, but that the collective does? I should point out, by the way, that this group-level approach is different from an ecocentric perspective in which species may be attributed moral status. In ecocentric theories this is not done on the basis of cognition.

In sum, different theories raise different questions regarding animal capacities, but all of the theoretical perspectives mentioned here require an interaction between empirical scientists and ethicists. A first issue that needs to be addressed is whether empirical scientists can make sense at all of the aforementioned questions. What do different disciplines mean by the terms that are used, such as intentions, beliefs, consciousness, and pain? Next, scientists and ethicists need to work out research strategies to test for these different capacities. An important question is what sort of test results would be sufficient to convince us that animals have these capacities. This question requires input from another branch of philosophy, namely cognitive philosophy, in particular comparative cognition. Recently we can in fact encounter more and more such interdisciplinary interactions and I hope that this newsletter is a case in point.

* Thanks to Clemens Driessen for his comments.

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Investigating animal consciousness

Is it obvious to you that animals are conscious? Or do you think that there is simply no way we could possibly know if animals are conscious, because they cannot tell us about their experiences? These two opposing views are both reasonable and entirely unhelpful to the project of investigating animal consciousness scientifically. What we need is some way to think about consciousness that makes it possible to run tests to see which animals are conscious, if any.

The first task is to narrow down the many uses of the word 'consciousness' to a single target. Thomas Nagel suggested that consciousness is 'what it's like' to sense red or feel pain. If someone pokes you while you are in a state of dreamless sleep, there is nothing it is like to feel that poke. You might turn over or release your grip on the covers, but not as a result of conscious decision. You're just responding to the poke. If, on the other hand, you happen to be awake at the time of the poke, there is something it is like to feel that poke. You might report on it – 'hey, that hurt' – or just respond in the very same way you would have while still asleep.

The fact that you might respond to a poke in the same way whether or not you are conscious of the poke shows that consciousness is not necessary for simple sensory responses. So we can't determine whether an animal is conscious just by noticing that it responds to sensory stimuli. Something more is needed, but what?

Edmund Husserl provided a clue when he noted that time is essential to the structure of consciousness. The world appears to us from the perspective of a now-point that includes a brief span from just past to just ahead. Consciousness represents the world as enduring, its changes marked by the succession of now-points one after the other. Memories of the distant past or plans for the future may be included among the contents of consciousness in the sense of now remembering that lovely vacation last year or now imagining how next year's vacation will be. But these sorts of experiences indicate self-consciousness and so are not the primary target for investigation. Our everyday conscious experience is focused outward on the world, not inward on our selves, and this externally oriented experience is most likely to be shared with animals.

The next and most contentious task is to connect this description of consciousness as a representation of the world at the present moment with some form of behavioural indicator. It seems that for any particular behaviour we could always ask why that behavior indicates consciousness. Couldn't a creature do that without being conscious? My proposal is that flexible behaviour indicates consciousness because an animal could not respond differentially to particular features in the present environment unless it is able to represent those features in relation to its goals. The environment appears in a certain way now, and this differs in various ways from the desired environment. There is a predator on the horizon, or no food is available, or scratchy bristles are all around. Without an ability to distinguish how things are now from how things might otherwise be, there is no way to consider alternate paths from here to there. That is, a representation of the world at the present moment is essential to flexible behaviour as well as being essential to the structure of consciousness.

Flexible behaviour is methodologically useful because there are many ways to demonstrate it. I will consider four general sorts of demonstrations: 1) differential response to the environment, 2) adaptation to novel situations, 3) manipulation of the environment to accomplish goals, and 4) representation of absent objects. First, behavioural response that is appropriate to particular features of a situation is the minimum requirement for flexible behaviour; all three of the other ways to demonstrate flexibility also show the capacity for differential response. Animals have no need to represent the present situation if they are so perfectly adapted to their niche that stimulus signals always dictate behaviour. If, on the other hand, different responses to a particular situation are possible, an animal must be able to utilize information learned in the past to determine which response is likely to be best. A variety of elements from past encounters needs to be integrated for the assessment of the present conditions in relation to future goals.

A second way to demonstrate flexible behaviour highlights the role of novelty in consciousness. As just noted, past associations necessarily figure in the evaluation of a novel situation, but the combination of features has never before been experienced at the same time. A representation of the present moment in all its uniqueness is necessary for an animal to determine which action is most suitable for its current goals.

No backward-looking algorithm is sufficient to calculate appropriate behaviour; the calculus must be geared toward the future based on present peculiarities. The conscious animal combines feature A and feature B as components of the world now and utilizes this combination to guide action.

The ability to manipulate the environment to accomplish goals is a third behavioural indicator of flexibility, and so of consciousness. Proactive, problem-solving skills require the ability to think about how to change the environment in just the right way to bring about a goal. Tool use is a good example of problem-solving behaviour because an animal must make use of the object as an intermediary step toward achieving the reward. The object used as a tool is not itself of value; it has interest only in relation to the desired object. Most importantly, the animal must not respond directly to the desired object itself but instead focus its attention on the tool as an indirect means toward its final goal. Rather than simply responding to stimuli, the tool-using animal represents currently available objects and their relations to one another in order to recognize the value of the tool in reaching its reward. An animal that is not capable of this sort of representation would likely abandon a desired object in favour of an immediately accessible reward.

The final way to demonstrate flexibility may be the most difficult to appreciate. In order for an animal to respond differentially to current conditions, it must be able to represent features of the present environment as well as features of a desired but not yet present environment. That is, an animal must be able to represent what is absent. The ability to represent in absence may seem too cognitively sophisticated as well as too difficult to demonstrate to be a useful tool for investigating animal consciousness. But something as simple and naturalistically viable as navigating a maze can be used to test the capacity for representation in absence. If an animal trained to find a reward in a maze is able to find the reward location from different points in the maze, the animal must have a representation of the reward location that is independent of any particular starting location. Set down in a new spot, the animal represents the reward location and heads off in the appropriate direction. It is crucial to ensure the navigational success is not due simply to patterns of association based on a stimulus cue, because the present cue would be sufficient to guide the animal to the reward instead of a representation of the absent reward as a guide. A T-maze elegantly distinguishes these two possibilities. If an animal has learned that the way to get the reward is to go straight for some distance and turn right for some distance, then it won't find the reward when starting from the other leg of the T. It must be able to represent its current location and the goal location to determine that it must not turn right in order to reach the reward.

These four ways to demonstrate flexible behaviour are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. They provide an initial link between behaviour and consciousness that can be the basis for further research on the ways animal minds are similar to and differ from human minds. Another essential component in the investigation of consciousness is physiological research on how exactly human and non-human animals have the capacity for flexible behaviour. Evolutionary and developmental psychology can also help solve the question of how and why some animals have the capacity for conscious experience and others do not.

The important result is to see that animal consciousness is not obvious, nor is it impossible to investigate. If we think about consciousness as a representation of presence which has the function

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of enabling flexible behaviour, we can design ways to test for consciousness. Perhaps another way of thinking about consciousness is better. No doubt philosophers and scientists will continue to debate the matter. Whatever we decide is the best way to think about consciousness, one of the criteria ought to be what it tells us about animals. A theory of consciousness that is no help in guiding scientific research with animals is a theory we should not accept.

Sentimentality and Objectivity in Comparative Cognition

Those who level the anthropomorphism charge against comparative cognition researchers often aim to account for where their target has allegedly gone wrong by providing psychological explanations for the perceived scientific misbehaviour. A common explanation is that the researcher has been misled by her or his emotions – the result of an overly sentimental attitude toward the research subjects. This allegation of “sentimentality” is interesting because its purpose is to further impugn the credibility of comparative cognition scientists whose research programs or inferences have been deemed anthropomorphic [11, 16, 17]. For example, Helena Cronin, commenting on Donald Griffin’s “anthropomorphic” turn toward cognitive ethology writes: “A Griffin bat is a miniature physics lab. So imagine the consternation among behaviouristic ethologists when Mr. Griffin came out ... as a sentimental softy” [3]. Similarly, Stephen Budiansky suggests that the “political agenda [of animal rights groups] behind claims for animal consciousness seems at times to have become the driving force and *raison d’être* for such [anthropomorphic] research [as ape language programs]” [5]. John Andrews Fisher provided arguably the most thorough analysis and debunking of the so-called anthropomorphic mistake, but noted that the concomitant allegation of sentimentality remains underexplored [11]. I concur and offer a brief analysis of the allegation.

Allegations of sentimentality are concomitant with allegations of pre-scientific or non-scientific behaviour, suggesting that the critics consider sentiment to be associated with vulnerability to poor arguments and sloppy reasoning [9, 25, 28]. However, this association assumes that being empathetic and being easily persuaded by faulty reasoning are psychologically interconnected phenomena. There are two principal ways in which this relationship is cashed out:

- (1) Caring about animal welfare interrupts the acquisition of knowledge by exposing the scientist to, e.g., selection bias, leading her to interpret results in a way that confirms her prior beliefs.
- (2) Caring about animal welfare is itself irrational, impugning the epistemic credibility of anyone who holds the belief that animals are appropriate objects of compassion [6].

Let us assume that (2) is false: believing that animals matter morally is simply not on par with the sorts of beliefs that one would rightly take to be a sign of a deep irrationality, such as, e.g., belief in telekinesis. We cannot, however, dismiss (1) as easily.

At this point the reader may object that psychological explanations of scientists’ behaviour are inadmissible and that the sentimentality allegation can be easily dismissed as an *ad hominem* attack. However, this *prima facie* plausible objection does not hold: although the purpose of the sentimentality allegation is to delegitimize research by impeaching the objectivity of the scientist [11], the allegation is not

a simple ad-hominem fallacy. Because science is an activity that takes place within communities, the reliability of the research depends on the abilities and conduct of the researchers as well as on the reliability of instruments and methodologies. Sociological and psychological critiques are therefore admissible alongside assessments of methods, instruments, and inferences. Daston and Galison [8] describe the intimate connection between scientific norms and the scientific personalities that are presumed necessary for carrying out the required activities: Appropriate methodologies require practitioners who have tailored their personalities to suit their subject of study. On this view, scientific conduct is not divorced from the scientist qua individual, and always requires the refinement of personality traits, such as attentiveness or creativity, in order to meet the prevailing scientific norms. Critiquing features of the person – such as her level of compassion – is an admissible form of scientific critique.

However, while the form of the sentimentality allegation is appropriate, the content is not. This is due to the fact that those who use “anthropomorphism” as a pejorative and who trace its roots to sentimental “softness,” are implicitly drawing on one of many versions of objectivity in the sciences: the ideal of emotional detachment (IED), as pilloried by Rudner in 1953:

“The perfect scientist — the scientist qua scientist does not allow this kind of value judgment to influence his work. However much he may find doing so unavoidable qua father, qua lover, qua member of society, qua grouch, when he does so he is not behaving qua scientist” [24].

Those with whom the allegation of sentimentality resonates form a community with norms that exclude some scientists (those who care about the welfare of their subjects) and include others (those who think that caring about animal welfare has no place in their workplace – be it the lab, the field, or the editorial board).

However, the IED is problematic for two general reasons. First, it relies on the cognitive/affective dichotomy, which is rejected by many psychologists and some philosophers who view affect and reason as coordinated elements of cognition broadly construed [22, 18, 26]. Second, it is inconsistent with practice, since many scientists have passionate attitudes toward their research subjects without being accused of being non-objective. For instance, the researcher who is driven by her insatiable desire to learn about her topic is exempt from criticism, despite her zeal; the virologist who hates his research subject because of its impact on human lives is not thereby epistemically suspect; the ichthyologist who loves her studies because she finds fish to be aesthetically pleasing is unlikely to be faulted for allowing non-epistemic values into her scientific world.

Moreover, emotional investment in the research subject may aid in observational accuracy and development of hypotheses. Konrad Lorenz held that a love of animals was a requirement for the proper study of their behaviour [1, 12]. This love provides the motivation required to spend long hours attentively observing animals. The love that undergirds the patience required to gain expertise in observational abilities is supplemented by empathy with the animals. This empathy can facilitate knowledge-acquisition by aiding in focus and patience, thereby ensuring that minute behavioural changes are noticed and subtle patterns identified. This is equally true for primarily laboratory-based researchers as it is for field researchers such as Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth [7]. As one example, Irene Pepperberg may never have gained the expertise she needed with parrots were it not for her personal affection for her African Grey parrot, Alex [20], even if her exceptional drive for knowledge had been

enough to sustain her during the years before her work achieved broad recognition.

Affection toward ones' subjects, be they human or nonhuman, has proven to be advantageous in other fields as well. For example, Evelyn Fox Keller suggests that Barbara McClintock's Noble Prize-winning discovery of "mobile genetic elements" was made possible through the kinship she felt with her object of study, the maize plant [13]. Similarly, Janet A. Kourany notes that sociologist Anne Oakley's work with new mothers was aided by her refusal to adopt the position of an emotionally detached observer, which had demanded that the women be treated as "data producing machine" [13]. Further examples include, inter alia, the suggested increase in diagnostic accuracy of primary care physicians who approach their patients with care and attentiveness, rather than succumbing to the financial incentives to minimize time spent with and energy spent on individual patients [10; 27].

Sceptics may object that caring may lead to what Colin Allen has called "trophy-hunting," or the desire by some scientist to "show that their favourite species can (too!) do what another species can do" [2]. Although Allen's critique of trophy-hunting in comparative cognition does not mention sentiment, we might imagine how such an objection might run: The anti-sentimentalist could argue that researchers who are concerned that members of a species, S, are harmed by practices that ignore these animals' capacity to have morally salient experiences, E, may be more likely to conclude that member of S possesses faculties required for such experiences (e.g., episodic memory). However, trophy-hunting need not be motivated by a concern for animal welfare and animal welfare concerns need not lead to trophy-hunting. While caring may lead to trophy-hunting, it is far from being alone among such motivations. It could be motivated by professional aspirations such as the desire to get published, receive research funding, or garner the respect of colleagues. In fact, caring about the animal subject may decrease the chances of a false positive, as researchers who are worried that some species can suffer may wish to find evidence to the contrary to ease their own minds.

In summary, the pursuit of a version of objectivity that is improperly suited to the goals of comparative cognition has resulted in the conflation of epistemic impartiality with emotional disengagement. The worry over sentiment corrupting knowledge both fails to appreciate the positive and productive role that sentiment has played in science and misrepresents the connection between emotion and cognition. Far from contaminating research or demonstrating intellectual weakness, emotional engagement with the study subject can inform both experimental and observational investigation in comparative cognition.

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Socio-cognitive abilities in animals and their moral relevance - Workshop

Summary of the Workshop “Socio-cognitive abilities in animals and their moral relevance” at Utrecht University, 4 July 2012 (embedded in Minding Animals 2, Convenors: Dr. Judith Benz-Schwarzburg / Prof. Dr. Herwig Grimm, Messerli Research Institute, University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna, Medical University Vienna, University of Vienna)

The workshop was addressing socio-cognitive abilities and their moral relevance from an interdisciplinary perspective. It was hosted by the Chair Prof. Dr. Herwig Grimm (Vienna), who pointed out that the workshop was funded by the European Science Foundation (CompCog Network).

Prof. Grimm introduced the topic of the workshop by pointing out that we gained an ever growing knowledge on complex socio-cognitive abilities in animals within the last decades of research in human-animal studies. The panel discussed the question what this knowledge tells us in regard to the human-animal relationship and forms of human-animal interaction. Prof. Grimm connected the four presentations with each other: The first speaker, Prof. Dr. Ludwig Huber (Head of the Unit of Comparative Cognition at the Messerli Research Institute Vienna) presented some highlights of cognition research in animals from the past few years and interpreted them from an ethological point of view. His colleague, Dr. Judith Benz-Schwarzburg (from the Unit of Ethics and Human-Animal Studies at the Messerli Research Institute), addressed welfare and rights implications arising from complex abilities and complex needs in animals. The panel then turned to two areas (the laboratory and the farm), where animals with complex socio-cognitive abilities are affected and harmed by human practices. Dr. Andrew Knight (Fellow at the Oxford Centre of Animal Ethics and working as a Vet) presented a critical assessment of chimpanzee experimentation. The last speaker, Dr. Suzanne Held, is an Assistant Professor from the Animal Welfare and Behaviour Group at the School of Veterinary Sciences of the University of Bristol. Dr. Held contributed with her expertise on farm animals, particularly on pigs. She discussed how the knowledge about domestic animal behaviour and cognition can be used in order to improve animal welfare on the farm.

The workshop was embedded in the programme of the international conference “Minding Animals 2”, initiated by Minding Animals International and hosted by the Ethics Institute (Department of Philosophy) and the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine of Utrecht University. About 80 people were attending the workshop. Considering that there were ten parallel sessions at a time, the workshop attracted many participants.

The aim was to bring together perspectives from ethology, animal welfare science and animal ethics. Minding Animals was the perfect place for scholars interested in this approach as the attendants came from the sciences and the humanities, from the field of research as well as from conservation and animal welfare practice.

Assessment of the results and impact of the event on the future directions of the field

Research in Animal Cognition has been primate-centric for decades. Increasingly, other animals than primates (or even more narrow: great apes) are being studied. The workshop presented research in many

different species (from birds to pigs and apes). Thus, the Convenors hope to impact the future direction of the field of Human-Animal Studies (HAS) in the sense that a wide range of species is being considered. Above all, domestic animals like pigs, which suffer in intensive livestock farming in great numbers, should be taken into account when it comes to the ethical considerations.

Furthermore, cognition is very often defined quite narrowly. The workshop, in contrast, focused on complex abilities involving cognitive as well as social capacities. Stressing such connections might impact the field in the sense that it can overcome a reductionist view on cognition, which excludes social cognition.

And last but not least, the future of the field HAS will undoubtedly be an interdisciplinary or even a transdisciplinary one. This workshop was an endeavour to bring together researchers from the humanities (ethics and philosophy) and the sciences (ethology, veterinary medicine). As the workshop was part of an internationally, transdisciplinary conference, participants were either scientists or animal advocates, who work or deal with animals in a non-scientific context. In this sense, the workshop went beyond a purely scientific interest in animal cognition. The question was as well what scientific research can tell us about the human-animal relationship in general. It became obvious that a whole range of implications arise from differences and similarities between humans and non-human animals. They range from welfare issues in the lab, on the farm and in the zoo to rights issues concerning absolute limits of what we are allowed to do with animals in different contexts. If complex abilities lead to complex needs in animals, we are morally obliged to grant animals the fulfillment of such needs. Some forms of using animals become questionable if we can't guarantee a husbandry system where animals can behave according to their ethological needs. So, implications from cognition research to ethics range from severe (like the abolition of practices, which are connected to severe physiological and/or psychological suffering) to manageable (e.g. by introducing enrichment as a mitigation option). It was the deliberate goal of this workshop – as it will be an important task for the future of the field – to make these implications visible and to discuss them.

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Initiatives by TTN Munchen

The Institute Technology – Theology – Natural Sciences (TTN), an independent institution at LMU Munich, announces two initiatives this summer:

TTN is making a call for papers for the “TTN Essay Preis 2013”. Young researchers are asked to write an essay on the subject: “Improving nature. Biotechnology in the age of Anthropocene.”

Students from all disciplines are welcome. Prize money: 2 x 1.000 Euro. The essays have to be in German. Closing deadline: 15 September 2013.

<http://www.ttn-institut.de/essay-preis-2013>

TTN will organize a so called “Klausurwoche” (summer school) for young researchers in 2014 on the subject “Bio-patents”. The language will be German.

For more information, please contact:

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Books and Publications

Animal Suffering: Philosophy and Culture

Elisa Aaltola
Series: The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013

Killing Happy Animals: An Exploration in Utilitarian Ethics

Tatjana Višak
Series: The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013

Growing Moral Relations

Mark Coeckelbergh
Palgrave MacMillan, 2012

Ethik der Mensch-Tier-Beziehung

Ursula Wolf
Klostermann RoteReihe Band 49, 2012

Conferences 2013

August 4-10

XXIII World Congress of Philosophy. Philosophy as Inquiry and Way of Life
Athens, Greece
<http://www.wcp2013.gr/en/>

August 12-18

Wittenberger Sommerakademie 2013: Tier im Menschen, Mensch im Tier – Ein Grenzgang zwischen der Arten
Halle-Wittenberg, Germany
http://www.sfi-halle.de/projekte-details-141-wittenberger_sommerakademie_2013_fuer_studierende_und_promovierende.html

August 22-25

Climate Change, Sustainability and an Ethics of an Open Future,
Societas Ethica Annual Conference
Kontakt der Kontinenten, Soesterberg, Netherlands
<http://www.societasethica.info/annual-conference-2013>

August 24-31

3rd International Conference on Environmental, Biomedical and Biotechnology (ICEBB 2013)
Singapore
<http://www.icebb.org/>

August 28-31

The Fourth Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA)



	Helsinki, Finland http://www.helsinki.fi/epsa13/
September 6-7	2nd International Conference on Water and Society New Forest, United Kingdom http://www.wessex.ac.uk/13-conferences/water-and-society-2013.html
September 11-14	Eursafe 2013: The Ethics of Consumption: The Citizen, The Market, and The Law Uppsala, Sweden http://www.slu.se/eursafe2013/
September 16-17	Symposion: Jedem Tier (s)einen Namen geben? Die Individualität von Tieren und ihre Relevanz für die Wissenschaften Eferding, Germany http://www.buendnis-mensch-und-tier.de/pages/veranstaltungen.htm
September 23-28	Summer School for Cultural and Literary Animal Studies (CLAS): Politische Zoologie Würzburg, Germany http://www.ndl1.germanistik.uni-wuerzburg.de/forschung/nachwuchsnetzwerk_cultural_and_literary_animal_studies/summer_school_clas/
September 29-Oct 2	First International Conference on Global Food Security Noordwijkerhout, The Netherlands http://www.globalfoodsecurityconference.com/#
October 7-8	International Conference on Food and Agricultural Sciences Melaka, Malaysia http://www.icfas.org/
November 17-18	2nd International Conference on Biodiversity and Climate Change (ICBCC 2013) Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates http://www.icbcc.org/
November 23-24	2013 4th International Conference on Biology, Environment and Chemistry (ICBEC 2013) Phuket, Thailand http://www.icbec.org/
November 28-30	The First International Conference of the Asia-Pacific Society for Agricultural and Food Ethics (APSAFE2013) Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University http://www.apsafe2013.org/
November 28-30	ICAS 3EU conf Technoscientific developments and Critical Animal Studies Karlsruhe, Germany https://critical-animal-conf.org/
December 20-21	MacroTrend Conference on Energy and Sustainability: Paris 2013 Paris, France http://www.macrojournals.com/conferences/energy_and_sustainability_paris_2013
February 6-8, 2014	Human-Animal Studies Konferenz Innsbruck, Austria http://www.uibk.ac.at/news/has/

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You are kindly invited to send any relevant contributions, conference calls, publication reviews, etc. to the editors.